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 Summary 
What characterises dissemination of intelligence? 
This thesis answers the question by studying intelligence dissemination as storytelling and 
prediction. It argues that the dissemination stage of the intelligence cycle translates processed 
intelligence into a product servicing the decision-maker. Faced with the risk of error and 
misunderstanding, the dissemination stage can secure the reliability of the conclusions, as it was 
formed at the processing stage. Dissemination is contextual, emphasising a dynamic of actors 
and their environment, which is familiar and understandable to the consumer. It delivers the 
service at an appropriate time.  
 
This way, intelligence dissemination makes the output of the processing stage accessible and 
thus applicable to the consumer. This is how the stage fulfils the purpose of intelligence by 
providing the consumer with improved situational awareness and an ability to create policy of a 
quality otherwise impossible. In combining these features to a narrative, intelligence can stand 
out with the decision-maker, and succeed in the narrative battle for his attention.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We must put the information out.  
We must capture the narrative. 
--  General Sir Rupert Smith, 2007 (:40) 
 
 
Intelligence is presentation. 
--  Lars Ulfving, 2002 (:97) 
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1 Introduction: What Characterises Dissemination of Intelligence? 
 
make.believe 
--  Sony Ericsson slogan, November 2009 
 
1.1 Embarkation Point and Research Question 
Literature and thinking on dissemination of products from intelligence organisations to 
intelligence consumers is filled with contrasts. On the one hand, there are statements like 
'Dissemination tends to be intelligence's Achilles Heel,' (Herman 1996:45) and 'This end stage is 
often the most difficult step in the intelligence cycle,' (Johnson 2009:46). On the other, the texts 
spend preciously few pages investigating these complexities further1. This paradox is the 
inspiration for this thesis. 
 
There may be three reasons for such contrasts.  
– One; the dissemination stage does not cause any trouble for the intelligence process. From 
the quotes above, this might not be the case.  
– Two; studying dissemination as an isolated phenomenon is not possible. That may be so, 
intelligence-making is a highly integrated process, but the dissemination stage is nevertheless 
singled out in textbooks and doctrinal approaches, and may thereby deserve some attention.  
– Three; dissemination has not been subject to extensive academic scrutiny. If so, that fact may 
prove a starting point for this study. 
Then, what characterises dissemination of intelligence? Springing from the observations above, 
this will be the thesis' research question. 
 
The thesis will argue that the dissemination stage of the intelligence cycle translates the output 
of the intelligence process into a service, which fulfils the purpose of intelligence itself by 
enabling the decision-maker to do something he otherwise could not. Faced with the risk of error 
and misunderstanding, the dissemination stage can secure the reliability, accessibility and 
applicability of the product by utilising elements of narration, making the intelligence product 
stand out to the decision-maker. Thereby intelligence may shape the consumer's frame of 
reference, and be a valuable contribution to his situational awareness.  
 
This introduction will further outline the basics of the thesis; its purpose, its analytical construct 
and foundation in literature, its research design and its structure. 
                                                 
1
 See f i Herman 1996:44-47 (4 pages of 385) and Lowenthal 2009:62-64 (3 pages of 329). The quality of the 
literature should of course not be estimated by volume alone, but the brevity does nevertheless beg the question 
posed in this thesis. 
--  10  -- 
 
1.2 Aim and Purpose 
This section will introduce what the thesis aims to achieve and why it does so. The rest of the 
chapter will show how this is going to happen. 
 
1.2.1 Aim: What to Achieve 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a thorough exploration of the dissemination stage of the 
intelligence process. It will discuss dissemination's purpose, explore particular challenges when 
conveying intelligence predictions, and it will discuss the narrative aspects of transferring 
processed intelligence products to the decision-maker. 
 
1.2.2 Purpose: Why Achieve It 
The purpose of this thesis is to elucidate an understanding of what and how the dissemination 
stage contributes to the purpose of intelligence. This may, in turn, lead to a better understanding 
of how the dissemination stage is utilised to the benefit of intelligence agencies and their 
consumers.  
 
1.3 Construct of Analysis 
1.3.1 Application of the Research Question 
What characterises dissemination of intelligence? The thesis will answer the research question 
by studying intelligence dissemination as storytelling and as prediction. It will explore literature 
and theory on intelligence, prediction and narratology. As gaining an understanding of the 
concepts in the research question – intelligence and the dissemination of it – is part of the thesis' 
project, each of these concepts will be elaborated at separate stages in the study. The purpose of 
this section, then, is to show how the thesis will conduct this exploration of the concepts. 
 
1.3.2 Place in Research Field 
This thesis will study one particular segment of intelligence, its dissemination from the provider 
to the consumer. If the larger field of research on intelligence is represented by the (somewhat 
normative) question 'what constitutes good intelligence?' (cf Lowenthal 2009:174), the thesis' 
relative position in the field is illustrated by figure 1.1. 
 
The thesis will not explicitly debate other questions. Though, delineating dissemination towards 
other parts of the research field and intelligence cycle will at times be necessary to elucidate its 
--  11  -- 
properties. This goes in particular for intelligence processing, dissemination's forerunner, and for 
intelligence and its purpose, which dissemination serves.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. The intelligence research field. Research questions are examples only. 
 
1.3.3 Progress of Inquiries 
The research question is a rather broad and open one. The project of answering it will be broken 
down into four specific questions, which will be explored and discussed in turn. 
– What constitutes intelligence, and how is it put together and conveyed to the end user? 
Answering this question provides a framework for analysing dissemination's role as part of 
the intelligence process. It is done in chapter 2. 
– What is achieved at the dissemination stage of the intelligence cycle? Answering this 
question provides an understanding of the purpose of dissemination and the tasks attributed 
to it. It is done in chapter 3. 
– How does intelligence dissemination adhere to narratology? Answering this question 
provides an insight to how intelligence dissemination may stand out in a larger flow of 
information. It puts intelligence dissemination in the context of strategic communication, 
where several sources claim influence on and attention from the decision-maker. It is 
explored in chapter 4.  
– What needs to be disseminated to support a predictive conclusion? Answering this question 
provides an understanding of how assessments with no corresponding factual basis can be 
made understandable. It does however require a supplementary exploration of what an 
intelligence prediction is, and how it is constructed during intelligence processing. This is 
done in chapter 5. 
 
By this approach, the analysis to follow aims to explore, describe and discuss the dissemination 
of intelligence, not only from textbook or doctrinal 'how-to' positions, but as well from 
perspectives of content, challenges and communication. 
What is the purpose 
of intelligence? 
What constitutes good intelligence? 
What 
characterises 
dissemination of 
intelligence? 
What characterises 
analysis and processing 
of intelligence? 
What is 
demanded in 
order to direct 
intelligence? 
What characterises 
intelligence 
collection? 
What is believable to the 
consumer? 
--  12  -- 
 
1.3.4 Dissemination: What and Why 
This thesis is all about the concepts of dissemination and its character. As a preliminary 
operationalisation, intelligence dissemination denotes the conveying of information from the 
intelligence organisation to the end user. This is the study's subject, and it will be detailed 
extensively, starting in the next chapter. 
 
The motivation for studying intelligence dissemination is twofold. One is the contrast in 
intelligence literature referred to at the start of this chapter. Another is intelligence's place in the 
flow of information inflicting on the decision-maker. Describing his War Amongst the People 
paradigm, Sir Rupert Smith illustrates the challenge to a commander trying to win the public's 
hearts and minds (2007:36): 
 
'We operate now as though we were in a theatre or Roman circus. The theatre commander needs 
to produce a more compelling narrative than his opponent in the minds of the people.' 
 
He concludes (2007:40): 
 
'We must put the information out. We must capture the narrative. We must understand the theatre 
of operations as a theatre and the theatre commander […] must be setting out in his campaign to 
write a more compelling script than his opponent. We must explain ourselves to the people in the 
theatre and those at home and in parliament.' 
 
Looking at his approach allegorically, from the perspective of intelligence, demonstrates the 
importance of successful dissemination. The tempo of contemporary decision-making is 
increasing (Coker 2007), and intelligence needs to stand out to its audience. If not, the rather 
expensive process is in vain. To do so, intelligence can be analysed like storytelling – just as Sir 
Rupert indicates that strategic communication can. As intelligence often implies prediction 
(Hagen 2009), an intelligence narrative conveys a story of how future developments will be. 
Bent Flyvbjerg (2001:137) indicates that a narrative form is particularly beneficial for conveying 
predictions, as narratives 
 
'provide us with a forward glance, helping us to anticipate situations even before we encounter 
them, allowing us to envision alternative futures.' 
 
This is the reason for the selection of topics included in the thesis. Answering the research 
question by way of this approach may contribute to the understanding of how intelligence can 
stay relevant and applicable to a decision-maker. 
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1.3.5 Characteristics: What and How 
Where and how, then, will the study look for the 'character' of intelligence dissemination? In 
broad terms, the thesis will understand 'characteristics' as 
– what dissemination 'does' or 'achieves' – its tasks; 
– how it is formed by its challenges, and how it faces them; and 
– its relationship to other phenomena or entities in the intelligence process. 
 
However, the subject matter of this thesis is somewhat hard to grasp. 'Dissemination' is a phase 
in a cycle. Chapter 2 will show it as a square in a flow-chart. Can a phase have character? Which 
qualities are implicitly conferred upon a 'phase' in a project looking for its 'character'?  
 
Chapter 2 will argue that dissemination is a function in the intelligence process, not a structural 
element. This is a study of that phase, not of a group of human beings. Stating, as this study will 
repeatedly do, that dissemination 'does' something is therefore troubled. Whether the phase is 
active, in creating or adapting something of value for the decision-maker, or passive, merely 
transmitting products previously constructed, is a question that will be debated several times 
over. The thesis will, however, show that what is done in or during the dissemination stage of 
intelligence-making is different from what goes on in the other stages. And, obviously, the 
process is not a machine. What is done, is done by humans. Some of them are analysts or 
managers, as well as disseminators. And in that case, it may be useful to know the crafts apart. 
 
The thesis will, for good and bad, tend to treat dissemination as an active entity, at least 
linguistically. In the following, intelligence dissemination will 'do', 'act', and 'achieve'. 
 
The analysis to follow will isolate and explore one concept related to the research question at a 
time. It will attempt to elucidate dissemination's character in two parallel ways. One is to study 
dissemination from several perspectives. 
– Initially, the dissemination stage will be studied from the perspective of its formal position in 
intelligence at large. 
– Expanding this, dissemination will be studied from the perspective of communication, as 
intelligence, in order to stay relevant, needs to stand out among several sources of 
information that inflict on a policy-maker's decision. 
– Intelligence dissemination will as well be discussed in the context of what kind of product 
that is to be conveyed. Predicting future events is a forte of intelligence. Foretelling the 
unknown is a demanding task to dissemination, and may reveal more of its character. 
--  14  -- 
 
The second angle to character elucidation is to contrast findings with a line-up of challenges 
facing them. 
– The description of dissemination is contrasted with some sources of error in the intelligence 
cycle, in order to conclude which role dissemination has in mitigating them. 
– The brief exploration of narratology is contrasted by the concept of discourse failure in 
intelligence dissemination, in order to shed light on how compelling, consistent 
dissemination can maintain an innovative edge when transferring predictions. 
– The outline of prediction in science and intelligence is challenged by strained validity and 
high demands to reliability. The contrast sheds light on which preconditions that may back 
up a presentation of predictive intelligence. 
Overall, positive and negative qualities will be dealt with rather equally. The study's purpose is 
to explore and describe. It will be modest what regards the normative. It is ambitious for a study 
like this to go into explicit recommendations on amendments, just as it is prudent not to over-
emphasise any problems and challenges to its subject. The thesis, therefore, will be careful on 
both accounts. The aim of the study is not to find what may be wrong with dissemination and 
why things do not work, but to point to what does work, and why these things carry importance2. 
 
1.4 Review of Literature 
While being elusive and brief on dissemination as such, the literature on intelligence production 
and the relationship between intelligence provider and consumer is in steady voluminous growth. 
This overview will mention some works that influence this thesis. The literature falls in three 
main categories3: 
1. Textbooks, aiming at academic and professional education, offering a holistic perspective on 
intelligence's role and function. 
2. Texts on specific subjects. A not insignificant portion of these are on the causes and effects 
of intelligence failures. 
3. Doctrinal texts, aiming at providing guidelines (how-to and SOPs) for personnel actively 
engaged in intelligence production, management or consumption. 
 
                                                 
2
 There are numerous studies on what does not work; this will not be another. How intelligence often is studied by 
its negation is returned to in section 3.7. 
3
 A fourth category is intelligence history, but this bears less on the thesis and is thus omitted. A fourth source for 
the thesis is the works on epistemology, prediction and narratology. These are not works on intelligence specifically, 
as this section discusses, and will be referred to in section 1.5.3. 
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Two textbooks will be keystones among the thesis' sources. Michael Herman's (1996) 
Intelligence Power in Peace and War covers history, purposes, processes and debates about 
intelligence, primarily from a British point of view. Mark Lowenthal's (2009) Intelligence – from 
Secrets to Policy is remarkable for its brevity on dissemination (pages 62-64), but re-captures 
most of dissemination's qualities in its presentation of intelligence analysis (chapter 6). Written 
from a US point of view, the 4th edition offers modern and recognisable considerations on the 
intelligence process, and is overall more practical and less philosophical than Herman's book.  
 
Academic texts on specific subjects are abundant – and a large part is on intelligence's 
shortcomings. Uri Bar-Joseph's (2003; 2005) efforts to explain the lead-up to the 1972 Yom 
Kippur war has identified several concepts of intelligence failure with universal value. Richard 
Betts (2003; 2009) contributes to understanding politicization and the unavoidability of 
intelligence failure. Traditional studies of intelligence failure tend to focus on errors based within 
the intelligence organisation (cognitive errors), or error erupting from mission creep (integrity 
errors). Neumann and Smith (2004) introduced discourse failure as a source of error embedded 
in the linguistic and conceptual interface between the intelligence organisation and the consumer. 
This is a third category of error, presenting particular challenges to the dissemination stage. 
 
Woodrow Kuhns (2003) offers employable discussions on validity and reliability in predictive 
intelligence. Peter Gill et. al.'s anthology on intelligence theory4 contains several elaborated, 
specific contributions to intelligence production, purpose and provider-consumer relations. 
Marrin (2009) and Johnson's (2009) articles, in particular, go into some detail on dissemination 
and on its delineation towards other parts of the intelligence process.  
 
Study of doctrinal texts is limited by the classification official texts on intelligence procedures 
naturally are bound by. Only two will be referred to in the thesis5. The Norwegian Armed Forces 
Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD 2007) outlines intelligence briefly, but will be assumed to be 
in accordance with the current state of play. The Norwegian Army's handbook on operational 
planning (FR 3-1 2004) outlines tactical and operational guidelines in more detail, though in the 
                                                 
4
 Gill, Peter, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian (eds.) Intelligence Theory – Key questions and debates, Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2009. 
5
 NATO's Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine (AJP 2 2003) offers a basic and brief 
view of NATO's best practice on intelligence production. For reasons of classification, it is used exclusively as 
background for this thesis. In spite of being classified NATO/PfP Unclassified, its content and positions are not 
generally releasable. The doctrine has, however, been used to check the usage of other doctrinal documents. Apart 
from this note, it will not be referred in the thesis. 
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same vein. Ulfving (2002), though a textbook, is based closely on Swedish and NATO doctrinal 
approaches. It will as well be used as a source to current practice. 
 
As a consequence of the literature's lack of depth on the dissemination of intelligence, there are 
few pointers to what – if anything – the dissemination stage does to improve intelligence, reduce 
error or enhance understanding. (However, there are plenty of pages written on what can be done 
by collection or processing.) This thesis will explore what role, if any, dissemination may have 
to these ends. 
 
1.5 Research Design 
1.5.1 Approach to Research Design 
This chapter has outlined most of the thesis' research design already: It has a qualitative, 
literature-based, exploratory approach, open-endedly aiming to identify some characteristics, or 
the lack of such, unique to intelligence dissemination as a phenomenon. The phenomenon is a 
phase in the intelligence-making process, where its outcome is transferred to the end user. This is 
not a case study, as it does not study one or more instances of dissemination, which can be 
singled out in time, space or context (Jacobsen 2005:92). Delineating the subject matter is indeed 
an implicit part of the thesis' inquiries. It is, however, a study of an activity, a process (Creswell 
2009:13). Studying a phenomenon shares the intensive research design of a case study: 
collecting and analysing information (literature and previous studies) in order to draw some 
conclusions that may contribute a clearer understanding of the phenomenon (Jacobsen 2005:89).  
 
This thesis has modest ambitions beyond this. On the basis of this approach, it has limited merit 
to attempt generalisations to all cases of intelligence dissemination. However, the elucidation of 
the phenomenon's character invites coming to a somewhat detailed understanding of the dynamic 
between the factors included (Jacobsen 2005:97). Chapter 6 will attempt to conclude by an 
outline to that effect. Therefore, modestly, the thesis will border on generalising a theoretical 
contribution to the study of intelligence dissemination.  
 
The research question does not presuppose any causality or correlation, and therefore, the thesis 
is not founded on any explicit variable interplay. It will not seek causal explanations (cf 
Jacobsen 2005:108ff). The intelligence process is not causal. Chapter 2 will show it as an 
interplay between individuals acting towards a common purpose. Chapter 3 and 6 will show that 
the character of dissemination as well may surface both before, during and after dissemination 
temporally takes place. 
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Therefore, the thesis' research design is intensive and qualitative, exploratory and describing, 
based on current practice and academic study, and it aims at understanding the character of a 
phenomenon and a process, in order to contribute to a clearer theoretical understanding of the 
role of intelligence dissemination.  
 
1.5.2 Approach to Theory 
This is a study of literature and theory on intelligence dissemination. Apart from its aim to 
contribute to a clearer understanding of the concept and the concluding outline in chapter 6, the 
thesis will not apply, test or create any particular theories or models. The theoretical inputs to the 
discussions will, however, be of three kinds: 
– Intelligence, its purpose and process, including the role of dissemination, will be studied 
based on textbook or doctrinal sources. These are not theories proper, but the intelligence 
cycle will be outlined as a simple model in chapter 2. The terminology and frame of analysis 
established on this basis will be maintained throughout the thesis. Primary sources for this 
information is FFOD (2007), Herman (1996), Ulfving (2002) and Lowenthal (2009). 
– Narratology, the study of narrative forms, complements the exploration of intelligence 
dissemination. It has its roots the study of literature and creative writing. The thesis will 
conduct a discussion on the concept's implications, primarily based on tutorial texts, 
supplemented by von Wright's (1971) and Bent Flyvbjerg's (2001) theories on social science. 
– Prediction is a theoretical and epistemological concept. The discussions on its construction 
and implications for dissemination are primarily based on the models of Georg Henrik von 
Wright (1971). 
 
1.5.3 Approach to Sources  
Intelligence as a topic is not inviting to academic study. Contemporary products and practices are 
usually classified, and studying historical sources may not produce conclusions useful for today's 
circumstances. Sources are thus somewhat problematic. The thesis' approach to sources can be 
outlined according to their three kinds (cf 1.4)6: 
                                                 
6
 Apart from the sources explicitly mentioned, it shall of course never be ruled out that other background, lectures, 
texts, discussions and experience influence the thesis. This does not, however, have any conscious bearing on the 
text, which is based on the sources quoted. A particular note should be made, however, on that I during the work on 
the thesis was allowed to participate in NATO's Crisis Management Exercise in March 2010. This provided valuable 
insight into strategic intelligence warning, processing and dissemination. My participation was organised jointly by 
my employer and NATO IMS, and I am grateful to both facilities. 
--  18  -- 
1. Academic texts are prone to studying history, or may be based on the personal experience of 
their author. They do, however, constitute a major part of the thesis' source material, and will 
be exploited to the degree they contribute to clarification and inter-linking of concepts related 
to intelligence dissemination and prediction.  
2. The texts on specific subjects will be exploited with similar scrutiny as textbooks. When 
views differ, they will be contrasted in order to improve insight and understanding. This goes 
in particular for the sources on philosophy or knowledge theory in chapter 4. The sources for 
this information are primarily textbooks, some of which are primers for undergraduate 
philosophy studies. This way the thesis aims to stay within 'mainstream' interpretation of 
epistemological concepts. Original sources are used primarily in the cases of von Wright 
(1971) and Flyvbjerg (2001). When applicable, though, these sources will be contrasted 
against textbook positions7. 
3. The few doctrinal texts and guidelines will be studied at face value – meaning that their 
content is assumed to be current practice. It has slim academic benefit to assume that the 
opposite might be the case. 
 
1.5.4 Alternative Solutions 
This introduction started out with a not-so-latent criticism of the poor state of studies of 
intelligence dissemination. On that basis, a study seeking to explore the field could take a 
number of approaches, apart from and along with the one described and chosen here. The same 
can be said for the approach to the research question: a broad and open question like that can be 
answered in a number of manners. A couple of alternative solutions may be mentioned here. 
 
In one end of the spectrum, an obvious way to study effective dissemination of intelligence 
products is to survey the intelligence consumers. What kind of product do they need, and when, 
in their view, does the intelligence agency succeed in disseminating their products convincingly? 
The results would be subjective to the decision-makers, of course, but could be of fundamental 
importance in learning about why resource-demanding intelligence products are sometimes 
ignored in decision-making, and how the agencies may improve their standing.  
 
                                                 
7
 Flyvbjerg (2001) sparked a certain debate on the purpose and method of social science. The anthology Making 
Political Science Matter: Debating Knowledge, Research, and Method, edited by Sanford F. Schram and Brian 
Caterino (New York: New York University Press, 2006) brought some positions together, and will be referred to as 
appropriate. The reason Flyvbjerg features repeatedly in the thesis is that his practical (so-called phronetic) approach 
to social science as a contribution to policy-making bears several similarities to the understanding of intelligence 
outlined in chapter 2 in this thesis. 
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This study does not go anywhere near this solution. The decision-maker as an entity in the 
intelligence process is not explicitly studied. It is assumed that he will treat a disseminated 
intelligence product with, as a minimum, equal interest as he would any other source of 
situational awareness. The reason is threefold: Surveying consumers would take both time and 
resources, and selecting the proper number and kind of respondents could prove demanding. 
Second, attaining unclassified information – basically, getting respondents to avoid 
contemporary examples – could prove difficult, and answers without context could be of less 
value. Lastly, a proper starting point for such a study would be to have a fairly good grip on the 
characteristics of dissemination as such – which is what this study aims to provide. 
 
Keeping the analysis internal to the functions of intelligence, then, could have made for a study 
comparing the qualities of or interaction between dissemination and other stages of the 
intelligence cycle. Delineation of concepts could have been done by contrasting, rather than 
isolating, them. Furthermore, a comparative study would have provided knowledge on more than 
one stage of the intelligence process, which would benefit a challenging academic subject. 
 
When this study does not attempt this approach either, it is for reasons of exploration and space. 
Intelligence collection and analysis is prolifically dealt with in the academic and doctrinal 
literature already. Dissemination is not. Thus, there is presumable more left to explore in one 
concept than in the others. Treating other stages of the intelligence process as deeply as 
dissemination is in this thesis, would furthermore push the set boundaries of the study. This 
would not encourage exploration. And, like with the other alternative above, a proper 
understanding of dissemination may be useful before moving into comparisons or more 
extensive studies. 
 
1.6 Outline and Outlook 
Apart from this introduction and from the concluding chapter, in which the research question is 
posed and answered, respectively, the thesis will be composed of four main chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 will describe intelligence as process, product and, most of all, an empowerment of the 
decision-maker. The chapter will establish a framework and terminology for the thesis, and will 
also point out that prediction is integral to many intelligence products. 
 
Chapter 3 will discuss the features of intelligence dissemination as a part of the intelligence 
process. It will argue that this stage, by conveying relevant and applicable information in a 
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timely manner, fulfils the purpose of intelligence. By introducing cognitive and integrity errors, 
the chapter will as well discuss dissemination's ability to amend error, and question the stage's 
suitability for separate study.  
 
Chapter 4 will discuss the implications of narrative forms for the dissemination of intelligence 
predictions. By discussing the impact of discourse failure, the chapter shows that a narrative 
format alone can not overcome challenges put to dissemination. Still, studying narratives in 
intelligence dissemination enhances several possibilities that may be constructive. 
 
Chapter 5 will discuss some approaches to intelligence prediction, and thereby identify which 
premises need to be conveyed to support forecasting assessments. By studying how a prediction 
is constructed, the chapter shows how reliability in the processing of intelligence predictions can 
lead to credibility and understanding in dissemination 
 
Lastly, chapter 6 will conclude with an attempt to draw a more detailed outline of the 
dissemination stage of the intelligence cycle, in response to the research question. It will as well 
look back to the both the detailed inquiries in section 1.3 and to the more colloquial questions in 
section 1.1, and briefly discuss whether there was anything to learn from the study at all, or if the 
literature is brief on dissemination for a reason.  
 
2 Intelligence: What, Why, How 
 
Strategic intelligence is a process, a means to an end. 
The end is security and the maintenance or enhancement of a relative advantage. 
--  Mark Phythian 2009 (:67) 
 
2.1 Purpose and Outline 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe what intelligence is, what it does and how it does it. 
This is done for two reasons. One is to establish terminology to be used in the thesis. The other is 
to introduce an understanding of intelligence by way of its purpose, which in the next chapter 
will be argued to be similar to those of the dissemination stage in the intelligence cycle.  
 
This will be done in three main parts. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 will outline an understanding of 
intelligence, along with its aim and purpose. Sections 2.4 to 2.6 will describe a common 
approach to the intelligence cycle and point to how it is applied and understood in the thesis. 
Before a brief summing up, sections 2.7 and 2.8 will outline some approaches to the intelligence 
product.  
 
A main argument of this chapter is that intelligence agencies work to service and empower the 
decision-maker, by providing him with processed information that increase his foundations for 
choosing an adequate course of action1. 
 
2.2 Intelligence: Product, Organisation, Process 
The traditional understanding of intelligence denotes three parallel concepts (Herman 1996:1-2; 
FFOD 2007:145; Lowenthal 2009:8):  
– the product that the intelligence organisation brings to the consumer;  
– the agency or organisation that in itself provides the product; and  
– the process in which the intelligence product is formed.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates these three aspects of the intelligence concept. While not a theoretical 
foundation per se, these concepts may constitute a framework for studying intelligence. 
 
The process, often referred to as a cycle, constructs the intelligence product. The process and the 
product are both organised within the intra-intelligence sphere, as part of the intelligence agency 
(Lowenthal 2009:3-5). The product is then disseminated to the consumer, the decision-maker, 
                                                 
1
 This thesis is not a study of intelligence as such, but of the dissemination phase of intelligence. This chapter, then, 
serves to establish general terminology of intelligence that will be maintained throughout the thesis. And, as chapter 
3 will argue that the intelligence dissemination fulfils the very purpose of intelligence, it is advantageous to establish 
a whole-process view early. 
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outside the intelligence sphere.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Intelligence as organisation, process and product. 
 
The cycle will be outlined in section 2.4 and illustrated by figure 2.2. The predictive nature of 
some intelligence products will be discussed in chapter 5. The intelligence organisations as such 
will not be explicitly studied in this thesis2. Intelligence dissemination, the topic of this thesis, 
operates on the fault line between the intra- and extra-intelligence spheres. While it will be 
addressed throughout the thesis, chapter 3 will examine its position in the intelligence cycle and 
its contribution to the purpose of intelligence.  
 
2.3 An Understanding of Intelligence by its Aim and Purpose: Servicing the Consumer 
More specifically than the three-partition above, intelligence may be understood by its purpose, 
which lies in the extra-intelligence sphere: '[…] to enable action to be optimized by reducing 
ignorance', as Sir David Omand (2007:99) puts it. Intelligence's purpose involves being put to 
use. 'Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of policy-
makers, and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those needs', Mark Lowenthal 
(2009:1) states. His understanding emphasises the consumer of intelligence3, and how his needs 
are serviced by the work of the intelligence organisation. Highlighting the hunger of the 
consumer even more, Jennifer Sims (2009:154) understands intelligence as 'the collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of information for decision-makers engaged in competitive 
                                                 
2
 This thesis will focus on the way in which the transference of an intelligence product serves to fulfil the purpose of 
intelligence as a phenomenon and service, and will thus not enter into historical or structural discussions on 
agencies. Intelligence organisations, what figure 2.1 calls the intra-intelligence sphere, will in the thesis as well be 
referred to as the intelligence provider, as opposed to the extra-intelligence consumer.  
3
 Several phrases are used to refer to this entity; f.i. customer, recipient and policy-maker (Herman 1996:39). This 
thesis will employ consumer and decision-maker to the same end. The use of masculine pronouns to refer to this 
entity is not intended to ignore the similar position of female and male decision-makers. The thesis will not study the 
consumer explicitly. However, the relationship, personal and institutional, between the intelligence organisation and 
the consumer is very likely to inflict on the quality of dissemination (Marrin 2009:147). Cf section 1.5.4. 
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enterprise'. These approaches all point to the aim and purpose of intelligence: to provide a 
consumer with information, in order to fill a need. 
 
The aim of intelligence4 is to provide the decision-maker with collected and elucidated 
information that is within his sphere of need and interest. Intelligence's purpose is, by way of 
such information, to influence and improve the decision-maker's basis for choosing his course of 
action; in short, to put him in a position where he can do something he otherwise could not do (cf 
Phythian 2009:58; Johnson 2009:34-35). Therefore, the information must be applicable to the 
decision-maker (cf Malnes 2009:2).  
 
Michael Herman (1996:2) refers to efficient and applicable intelligence as the consumer's degree 
of intelligence power, understood as a 'capacity to produce effects that are more advantageous 
than would otherwise have been the case'5. Intelligence is a tool, a service to increase the 
analytical ability of the decision-maker (cf Scott and Jackson 2004:3) 
 
Intelligence organisations provide this power by collecting and processing data and information, 
which is submitted – disseminated – to the decision-maker. This processing is often referred to 
as production, and the submitted information, written or oral, is referred to as a product. The 
product is thus the 'processed and narrowed' information which the policy-maker needs. But, 
importantly, intelligence does not serve its purpose by the product alone, but by the applicability 
provided to the consumer by way of the product and by the way it is disseminated to him6.  
 
2.4 Process: The Intelligence Cycle 
Intelligence-making is a relay. Each leg, stage or phase works together to fulfil the purpose of 
intelligence. As outlined above, this end is reached only at the last stage, and prior stages may 
                                                 
4
 In this thesis, the term aim is used to describe what is to be achieved, and the term purpose will describe why, to 
what end, the aim is to be achieved. 
5
 Herman explains that his concept of intelligence power is built on the quoted definition, which he in turn quotes 
from p 291 of L. Freedman's article 'Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power', in Freedman, L., P. Hayes and R. 
O'Neill (eds.) War, Strategy and International Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). This understanding of 
power retains the core of conventional social science definitions of power, where A can make B do something A 
wants, which B otherwise would not have done, because A controls some means of sanction (Gilje and Grimen 
1993:181-182). 
6
 A note should be made about the secretive nature of intelligence, which is consciously left out of this description. 
Intelligence matters are prone to classification for two reasons: i) in order to protect the organisation's sources and 
methods, which if compromised, are expensive to restructure (an intra-intelligence reason), and ii) in order to protect 
the decision-maker's intent and knowledge, which if compromised, will erode the relative advantage he gets from 
intelligence, and thus erodes the purpose of intelligence (an extra-intelligence reason). Thereby, the secrecy 
involved in intelligence is a means to those two ends, and is not a characteristic of the intelligence organisation, 
process or product per se, and will not be an explicit topic of this thesis (cf Phythian 2009:59; Sims 2005:37-40). 
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have own, partial aims. This section will outline a conventional understanding of the 
intelligence-producing relay; commonly referred to as a process or a cycle. 
 
Intelligence is formed through a gradual, sequential, progressive flow of production, where all 
functions are inter-dependent (Herman 1996:39; Johnson 2009:34; Marrin 2009:131). The 
process repeats itself in cycles, building an ever better understanding of the topic at hand (FFOD 
2007:147-48; Ulfving 2002:75-76). All stages are involved at all times, working on different 
phases of different topics (FFOD 2007:147). In the conventional model of the cycle outlined 
here, the basic assumption is that the consumer's information requirements precede the 
intelligence production process, and that the product of this process precedes the consumer's 
actual decision-making (Marrin 2009:133-36)7. 
 
There are several models for the cycle (Herman 1996:ch 3; Lowenthal 2009:ch 4; FFOD 
2007:147), sometimes adapted to fit different levels of intelligence. For the purpose of the thesis, 
the four stages Direction, Collection, Processing and Dissemination suggested by the Norwegian 
Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD 2007:147-148) offer a simple, applicable 
approach. These four core stages remain, along with the concept of the Consumer (the decision-
maker) (Herman 1996:39), implicitly parts of most models. (It is the direction and content of the 
links between them that differ8.) In brief, the stages play out like this9: 
– Intelligence Direction prioritises resources in three respects: with regard to tasks from and 
needs of the consumer; with regard to the intelligence organisation and the intelligence 
process; and with regard to the intelligence organisation's partners, sources and sensors. 
– Intelligence Collection exploits openly or candidly, hidden and open, technical and physical 
sensors and sources, in order to gather diverse and credible data and information on the topic 
at hand, and delivers these to single- or multiple-source processing. 
– Intelligence Processing denominates all collation, analysis, interpretation, elucidating 
(Omand 2009) and methodical evaluation of the gathered single- or multiple-source data and 
information, in order to form predictive assessments that make uncertain estimates less 
uncertain. 
                                                 
7
 As a.o. Marrin (2009:136ff) points to, this simple approach may be challenged by the fact that decision-makers 
may have agendas and intelligence personnel may have particular biases or pre-suppositions. This will be returned 
to in chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis. However, when doing a rather exploratory study like this, there is little reason to 
start out with the assumption that the conventional approach is wrong. 
8
 See, f.i., Herman 1996:284-296. 
9
 This overview is based on Herman (1996:39-47); Ulfving (2002:ch 6), AAP-6 (2010:2-I-6) and FFOD (2007:147-
148). 
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– Intelligence Dissemination is made up by the conveyance of the processed intelligence 
product to the consumer, at a time and in a form which makes it understandable, usable and 
valuable to him, reducing his degree of situational ambiguity.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. The intelligence cycle (simplified), adapted from FFOD (2007:147) and Herman (1996:39). 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the cyclic nature of the interplay between the four stages, along with a few 
other components that inflict on the understanding of intelligence production.  
 
The consumer is the end user of the intelligence product, and is often synonymous with the 
requesting or tasking authority and/or the decision-maker. The consumer is outside the 
intelligence sphere (Herman 1996:39) (as illustrated by the dotted line in figures 2.1 and 2.2), but 
is inside what Omand (2007:120-122) calls 'the circles of trust'; the institutions with access to a 
states apparatus of power in dealing with high-level decision- and policy-making. 
 
Returning to the relay analogy; while all stages of the cycle may have separate tasks, 
dissemination as the last stage is to fulfil the very aim of intelligence itself: providing applicable, 
relevant, reliable information in a timely manner. But like in a relay, this last stage cannot do it 
all by itself.  
 
2.5 Stages vs Structure 
The stages in the intelligence cycle do not coincide with the organisational structure of an 
intelligence agency (Aasberg 2009). There is not necessarily major physical or mental distance 
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between the production and analysis in the processing stage and the transference of the product 
in the dissemination stage. Analysts often construct and present their own products in person, 
adding to dialogue between provider and consumer (cf Lowenthal 2009:111). Nevertheless, the 
processing stage is qualitatively different from the dissemination. Evaluation, interpretation and 
integration of collected information demand a broader, more detailed approach. All aspects of 
this processing cannot be transferred to the consumer, and the selection of the relevant and 
appropriate is done with specific regard to dissemination (cf Lowenthal 2009:64). The mental 
processes and considerations differ between the two stages10. While not necessarily a separate 
structure in the intelligence organisation, dissemination is a separate process, and may be suited 
for separate study. 
 
2.6 Intelligence Dialogues 
A further way of explaining the intelligence process is by way of dialogues, the internal and 
external communication involved in it (Hagen 2009). These will at times be referred to later, and 
thus get a brief mention. 
– The tasking dialogue is between the consumer and intelligence direction, and aims at 
clarifying what tasks the intelligence organisation should perform, what topics it should 
study, and to which ends. 
– The internal dialogue is continuous between all four functions of the intelligence sphere of 
the cycle. It is the study of these processes that has triggered other, alternative models of the 
intelligence process. The dialogue aims at clarifying the status of the tasks, the availability of 
information, and the appropriateness of the product, in order to determine how the tasks are 
being solved11. 
– The product dialogue, between personnel involved in dissemination of the product and the 
consumer, aims at determining whether the product meets the consumer's needs. The output 
of this dialogue may trigger the tasking dialogue, further illustrating the cycle. 
Intelligence is formed and used by individuals. The concepts of dialogue therefore underscore 
that, in spite of the abstractness of some other concepts elaborated on in this thesis, intelligence 
is all about human beings actually talking to another (cf Johnson 2009:46-47; Marrin 2009:147). 
                                                 
10
 This will be part of the discussions in chapters 4 and 5. 
11
 Lt-Gen Hagen referred to this as 'intelligence dialogue'. To reduce ambiguity, it is here renamed 'internal 
dialogue.' 
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2.7 Product: Kent's Typology 
While intelligence on the one hand constitutes a service, a contribution to the general power base 
of national decision-makers, an intelligence agency more often than not executes the service by 
way of concrete products, analyses, assessments and estimates – documents and briefings. 
Sherman Kent distinguished between three types of intelligence output (Herman 1996:105-108):  
1. Current-reportorial intelligence reports recent developments on the topic at hand, and may 
offer limited, short-term predictions. The scope of this reporting is limited in both temporal 
directions: it constitutes new development, may supplement regular open-source journalism, 
and may offer a most-likely version of what may occur until further reporting is available. It 
may be immediate during a situation that develops quickly or unexpectedly, or it may be 
founded on established surveillance in areas of permanent interest. Its prime characteristic is 
that it avoids longer historical trends and any deep-rooted features of infrastructure, 
ethnography or economy, and that forecasting is brief and of limited ambition. Today, 
scheduled routine reporting, delivered at pre-determined intervals ('reporting periods') is 
usually made up of current-reportorial intelligence, and is in effect referred to as current 
intelligence (Lowenthal 2009:113; AAP-6 2010:2-C-20). 
2. Basic-descriptive intelligence reports outline features of a considerably more lasting nature. 
Such reporting detail permanent or inertly changing topics, and are suitable when 
familiarizing a decision-maker with a situation or area. Typical issues are political relations, 
economic, resource or infrastructure features of a society, military order of battle, religious 
influences and biographies of core personnel. Here, it is not the content of what is presented, 
but the manner in which the data are collected that make the product intelligence. Such basic 
intelligence may form the platform for prediction in the two other reporting categories (AAP-
6 2010:2-B-2). The initial stage of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) would as 
well be an example of basic intelligence (cf FR 3-1 2003:77). 
3. Speculative-evaluative intelligence reports may be based on both current reporting and basic 
intelligence. Their prime characteristic is their emphasis on prediction of future events, days, 
weeks or years ahead. Such reports are intended to support longer-term policy, and should 
aid the decision-maker to take steps to avoid, change or increase the effects described in the 
reporting, all in the national interest. Thus, current intelligence may share parts of the 
methodology, but is based primarily on ongoing or recent events. Speculative-evaluative 
intelligence may be referred to as long-term, as opposed to current, intelligence (Lowenthal 
2009:114). It takes any available scope of time, space and force into consideration, and 
makes an assessment or an estimate of what will be. This ability to predict is at the core of 
any intelligence agency's raison d'être (Herman 1996:106-107).  
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Prediction of future events or developments is explicit in the first and third output type and only 
indirectly a part of the second (how will the environment inflict on future operations or actions?). 
Later on, the thesis will go on to study how predictive products like these – the outputs of the 
processing stage of the intelligence cycle – may be translated through dissemination in order to 
constitute an enabling and empowering service to the consumer. 
 
2.8 Product: Warnings, Assessments and Estimates 
It may be useful to elaborate slightly on the variety of form in intelligence products, in order to 
clarify what intelligence dissemination has to convey, and which bearings this may have on the 
study of dissemination. These concepts will be referred to in the discussions later in the thesis. 
A.o., chapter 5 will return to predictions, as found in Kent's typology. These are found in both 
intelligence warnings and intelligence estimates or assessments. 
 
Intelligence warning is a central justification for keeping intelligence organisations (Herman 
1996:154; Kuhns 2003:94), and notifies decision-makers that an incident will happen before the 
actual fact. According to James McDevitt (nd12), time is at the essence of warning intelligence. 
He distinguishes between tactical and strategic warning, where the former is issued only after a 
hostile action is initiated, but before its consequences are severe. Strategic warning issues 
notification before any adversary action has taken place at all. In order to monitor a given 
situation, certain events are assumed to forego the warned-about incident. These are isolated in 
intelligence processing as indicators, and work best when they are  
– necessary preconditions of the development, 
– unambiguous to detection and consequence, and 
– visible to the point where the collection apparatus can actually track them. 
When the intelligence analyst determines that indicators are sufficiently telling, a warning may 
be issued. This is known as indication and warning (I&W) methodology (McDevitt; Handel 
2003:20; Lowenthal 2009:133). 
 
                                                 
12
 Unfortunately, my copy of James McDevitt's article, as entered in the literature list, is not dated or paginated. 
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Intelligence estimates (or assessments) are predictive, but not merely warnings13. In an estimate 
(as process and product), the intelligence analyst will identify the contextual forces involved, 
inflicting on the situation and development at hand (Kuhns 2003:97). She will consider history, 
incrementally, and make judgements as to whether current issues are out of step with previous 
ones. Assessing this totality, the estimate will make conditioned, justified statements to the 
decision-maker on how the current situation may play out over a given future time period, and 
assign a degree of probability to its own assessment (Herman 1996:258; Lowenthal 2009:136-
37). This leaves room for the decision-maker to evaluate his situation, and to come to a decision 
with considerable room for manoeuvre. 
 
It may seem like a warning is more direct, less infringed by all-source processing, than the more 
carefully elaborated estimates, making the former more actionable to the decision-maker (cf 
Kuhns 2003:94;97). This not necessarily so. An intelligence warning, due to its indicators, may 
be as contextual as an estimate. Intelligence organisations will explicitly or implicitly put 
analytical scrutiny on any collected information that may indicate a warning. Thereby, warning 
does not emerge outside a context already provided and maintained by estimative processes14.  
 
2.9 A Summary: Enhancing a Relative Advantage 
This chapter has outlined some concepts central to the understanding of intelligence. This was 
necessary in order to found the discussions on the dissemination stage of the intelligence cycle in 
the next chapters. 
 
In this chapter and in the thesis, intelligence is understood as 
– product, process and organisation, which ultimately 
– aims to provide the decision-maker with processed information that is within his sphere of 
need and interest, for the purpose of improving his foundation for choosing own actions, and 
thus put him in a position where he can do something he otherwise could not do. 
 
                                                 
13
 The use of the terms estimate and assessment is not unambiguous in literature. Herman (1996:237) and Lowenthal 
(2009:136) point to differences between UK and US terminology, but that is most likely only a part of the 
explanation. In US usage, any full-text intelligence report is referred to as an estimate (Kuhns' (2003) arguments 
draw on this American approach.). In British/European usage, an assessment is the evaluative part of an intelligence 
report, containing justified, conditioned predictions. Estimation is a methodological process, as described in the text, 
as much as a product. This thesis will (apart from the current section) primarily refer to assessments in the European 
sense, and estimation as its methodology. 
14
 However, it is what is not warned about that constitute a surprise. Surprise – what blindsides an intelligence 
organisation and a decision-maker – is what was never predicted, not analysed, or was put aside. What blindsides 
you is still what you do not see, or do not see well enough to identify (cf Handel 2003; Wirtz 2003:10
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Intelligence production is cyclic, but the staging of the cycle ought not to be confused with the 
organisation of an intelligence agency. Intelligence dialogues are maintained at all stages in 
order to make production transparent.  
 
Intelligence products take various forms to serve different purposes. Speculative-evaluative 
products make long-term predictions or forecasts. These may be expressed as estimates; 
contextual, conditioned analyses that present open-ended or alternative versions of future 
developments. This leaves the consumer free to consider his options. Warning is, as a form of 
prediction, a core function of intelligence. Warnings predict specific events or developments by 
way of a set of collectible, clear indicators.  
 
The next chapter will narrow the focus to the topic proper of the thesis, the dissemination stage 
of the intelligence cycle.  
 
 
3 Dissemination of Intelligence 
 
This end stage is often the most difficult step in the intelligence cycle […] 
--  Loch K. Johnson, 2009 (:46) 
 
3.1 Purpose and Outline 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and discuss the dissemination stage of the intelligence 
cycle, in order to explore its strengths and its weaknesses. A parallel purpose is to hint at an 
answer to the second colloquial question in chapter 1; whether intelligence dissemination can be 
studied as a separate phenomenon. 
 
This will be done in two main parts. Sections 3.2 to 3.6 will outline some basic understandings of 
what this stage is supposed to do, and discuss briefly its capacity to achieve the goals put to it. 
Thereafter, sections 3.7 to 3.9 will introduce a small selection of problems from the abundant 
literature on intelligence failure, and point to how some sources of error may inflict on the 
qualities of dissemination. 
 
A main argument of this chapter is that the dissemination stage fulfils the purpose of intelligence 
by conveying relevant and applicable information in a timely manner. The dissemination stage 
can not increase these qualities beyond the output from the processing stage. It does, however, 
play an active role in adapting and conveying the information in a manner which makes it 
accessible and comprehendible to the consumer. The challenges put to the dissemination stage 
from sources of error within the intelligence cycle can nevertheless primarily be mitigated 
elsewhere. In sum, this points to some challenges when studying dissemination isolated. 
 
3.2 The Dissemination Stage 
There is little academic or doctrinal disagreement about what is to be achieved by the 
dissemination stage of the intelligence cycle. Michael Herman (1996:44) states that 
'[dissemination's] aim is the delivery of useful, user-friendly product at the right time, especially 
when timeliness is at the essence for decision-taking'. The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint 
Operational Doctrine (FFOD 2007:148) explains dissemination as '[…] providing the right user 
with the right information at the right time' (cf AAP-6 2010:2-I-6). The terminology fits well 
with the role of an intelligence agency: the Norwegian Intelligence Service aims to provide the 
decision-maker with timely, reliable and relevant knowledge (NIS 2006:1). 
 
The following discussion will amplify a few key characteristics of dissemination, and will take 
the Norwegian doctrinal definition (FFOD 2007) as its point of departure. While right user and 
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right time are rather functional and measurable entities, the understanding of the right 
information will be given extra emphasis, as this essentially constitutes the qualities of the 
product that is disseminated1. 
 
3.3 The Right User 
The consumer's position in the intelligence cycle was briefly outlined in chapter 2. End users of 
intelligence are most often pre-determined before the product is ready for dissemination. This 
aids in fitting the foci of the product to the needs of the consumer (through a dialogue or liason) 
(Herman 1996:45-46; Johnson 2009:46-47). In operational-level intelligence there tends to be an 
integral hierarchy where the intelligence organisation is tasked to collect, process and deliver 
intelligence on a given matter by a given time. To whom intelligence is disseminated is thus a 
matter of command and control, and of security and authorisation. These subjects will not be 
dealt with further in the thesis, which will assume that the designated consumer is in a position to 
task, receive and utilise intelligence products.  
 
3.4 The Right Information 
3.4.1 An Overview 
In order for the information2 to be 'right' for the consumer, it must be relevant and applicable. 
Relevance is about what the consumer needs: whether the product answers the question put forth 
by the consumer, and whether the product expands his knowledge. Applicability is about whether 
the product, apart from being relevant to the consumer's sphere of interest, is fruitful to use: 
whether it can be exploited to his advantage (Johnson 2009:46-48). Where relevance, 
objectively, points to the consumer's interests and questions, applicability is subjective to how 
intelligence can contribute to the consumer's exploiting a relative advantage (cf Phytian 
2009:67). Nevertheless, none of this takes effect if the product is not disseminated in an 
accessible manner3. 
                                                 
1
 As the topic of this chapter and the thesis lies embedded within the word 'dissemination', a few lines on the 
paradox of the meaning of this term may be worthwhile. Etymologically, to disseminate is based on the Latin 
disseminatus, of disseminare, made up of the prefix dis, meaning 'away' or 'in all direction', and seminare (of the 
root semen), to 'plant' or 'sow' (Dictionary.com). Literally, to disseminate means to spread (a message) as wide as 
possible, and to as many recipients as possible. (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English). In intelligence, 
dissemination relates to specific, tailored conveyance of the intelligence product to a pre-determined consumer. This 
is quite another thing than the limitless, one-way mass broadcasting the term dissemination originally implies. 
2
 'Information' – as the doctrine states – is here to be understood as the output of intelligence processing. 
3
 The concept of accessibility, ensuring understanding with the decision-maker, is addressed in 3.4.3, but is 
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3.4.2 Relevant Information 
Relevance has two dimensions.  
– First and obviously, a relevant intelligence product answers the question posed, meets the 
consumer's needs for clearer understanding (Lowenthal 2009:64). Does it not, it will not be 
integrated into decision-making, whether or not it is reliable or valid. Should the topic be 
picked up on later, the assessments may be overtaken by events, and thus worthless to the 
consumer (Johnson 2009:46).  
– Second, in answering the question posed, the intelligence product can volunteer information 
and assessments needed in order to present a balanced and full-spectrum view of the topic. 
This may require more or other information and factors than the consumer asked for, but 
provides added value to his knowledge base (Lowental 2009:111; Sims 2009:156).  
An intelligence agency thus both answers the questions put to it (through a 'pull-principle' from 
the consumer's point of view), and provides ('pushes') analyses that, based on pre-determined 
task-lists and previous questions, ought to be of interest to the consumer. In the second instant, 
getting the consumer to take in analyses he did not know he asked for or needed is a harder 
dissemination task than providing answers to questions in which the consumer has declared 
interest (Marrin 2009:131-32; Johnson 2009:46-47). 
 
In any case, the tasking and product dialogues between the intelligence provider and consumer 
are key to the former's understanding of the latter's needs (Herman 1996:45-46). This, as well, is 
a double-edged sword. Consumers are more likely to appreciate intelligence assessments that 
solidify existing policies or ambitions (Johnson 2009:47-48)4. Disseminating intelligence 
selectively in order to get the decision-maker's attention runs the risk of losing out on important 
or alternative assessments that should have been considered. Too little dialogue can make the 
intelligence provider ignorant of the needs of 'the real world', rendering the dissonant assessment 
irrelevant and ignored by the consumer. Both these phenomena relate to politicization (cf Betts 
2003), which will be briefly discussed later in this chapter.  
 
3.4.3 Applicable and Accessible Information 
The product's applicability relates to the consumer's ability to draw useful inputs to his decision-
making from the product. This goes beyond the relevance; the product may be relevant, in 
addressing the consumer's needs, but if the format, wording or context is poorly tailored, it will 
nevertheless be misunderstood or ignored (Ulfving 2002:97). Therefore, the intelligence product 
                                                 
4
 Chapter 4 will discuss how intelligence can be disseminated to resonate with a decision-maker whose policy 
counters the intelligence product.  
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needs to be conveyed in a manner, pace, structure and format which is physically and mentally 
accessible to the consumer. 
 
The discussion on the qualities of dissemination may occasionally be lost in practicalities. 
'Electronically, there is never enough communication capacity', Herman (1996:45) laments, 
reflecting the challenges of secure and precise means of communication. These are physical 
considerations, solvable by non-intelligence means (computer systems, translation, commun-
ication – all speedy, flexible and robust, of course), and will not be further debated in this thesis.  
 
Herman (1996:2) emphasises how adequate intelligence ('right information') empowers the 
consumer, increases his clarity of perception of his own situation and possible choices, and puts 
him in a position where he can act. 'Actionable intelligence' is a lauded term (Johnson 2009:47) 
that demonstrates how the disseminated product fulfils the aims and purpose of the intelligence 
process by being applicable. Applicable intelligence provides 'information for decision-makers 
engaged in competitive enterprise' (cf Sims 2009:154).  
 
Applicable (or actionable) intelligence consists of information that speaks directly to the 
consumer's position (Omand 2007:99). The aim is not that the decision-maker necessarily shall 
act based on the intelligence assessments, but that they contribute to a clearer perception of 
other factors, and thereby that the decision-maker can evaluate his options better. This, as well 
as actually taking action, is an outcome of applicable intelligence5. 
 
However, for intelligence to come across as actionable requires that the product is mentally 
accessible to the consumer. Where applicability is a quality with the content, topics and 
assessments of the product, accessibility is a quality with the dissemination stage as such. If the 
wording, perspective or content of the product is too far from the consumer's frame of reference, 
he will neither understand nor apply the intelligence. The foundation for applicable intelligence 
may be laid in stages preceding dissemination, but the foundation for accessible intelligence is 
made by the dissemination stage. Here, the output from the processing stage is adapted to the 
consumer's preconditions for understanding. The product's applicability is made accessible to the 
                                                 
5
 This illustrates why the thesis will employ the terms 'actionable intelligence' and 'applicable intelligence' to similar 
ends. The reason is partly semantic (regarding the need to use the noun 'applicability' (there is no similar noun form 
of the adjective 'actionable')), and (more importantly) partly dynamic, as applicable intelligence is not necessarily 
solely translated to 'action', but as well encompasses the consumer's perception and understanding of his situation – 
his posture. 
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decision-maker by the way 'the story of the assessment' is told. Chapter 4 will return to this 
narrative aspect of dissemination. 
 
Returning to the 'pull' principle of relevant information, in tasking the intelligence provider, the 
consumer needs to take his own aims and ambitions into account, and know what obstacles he 
needs more information about in order to mitigate them. Proper tasking dialogue may allow the 
intelligence organisation to add – 'push' – further information that may be relevant to the 
consumer's sphere of need and interest (Herman 1996:45; Johnson 2009:47). Amplifying the 
product's relevance may increase its applicability. And vice versa. 
 
For instance, when considering different military approaches in a peace support operation, the 
decision-maker needs to know not only the qualities of his opponent, but as well assessments on 
collateral damage and on the assessed response from civilians6. With this information, the 
decision-maker can prevent unintended implications by engaging constructively with third 
parties, giving him an advantage before military action is taken. Adding further, accessible value, 
the intelligence product can tell the consumer why and how particular key people can aid in 
facilitating his intentions7, perhaps even to reduce the scale of kinetic operations. At strategic 
level, in a trade agreement negotiation, national authorities will benefit from information on the 
adversary's options and desires beside and beyond the agreement at hand, in order to determine 
who of them needs a rewarding or quick settlement the most. Information on the adversary's 
motivation or political vulnerabilities may nudge the decision-maker to see the value of applying 
intelligence information. This, more than merely lists of facts and figures, orders-of-battle, 
statistics and biographies, is actionable and applicable intelligence. This separates Kent's 
speculative-evaluative category of intelligence output from the basic-descriptive one. And the 
potential for application of intelligence information is the basis for Herman's intelligence power.  
 
3.5 The Right Time 
The timely dissemination of intelligence products hinges on when it needs to reach its purpose: 
when the increased clarity provided by the assessment can facilitate the consumer's decision-
making. Timeliness is therefore the intelligence agency's window of dissemination opportunity. 
When circumstance demands a decision, the consumer will not wait for the ultimate intelligence 
product. Christopher Coker (2007:87-89) demonstrates how the increasing tempo of modern  
                                                 
6
 This grows ever more important when considering Sir Rupert Smith's (2005) War amongst the people paradigm. 
7
 So-called Key Leader Engagement (KLE). 
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operations creates risks in decision-making. This affects intelligence dissemination in that the 
consumers' need for risk management and speedy, quick-fix solutions may fragment the 
consistency of dissemination and understanding of intelligence products. Intelligence must reach 
him in sufficient time to be actionable (Kuhns 2003:85). Therefore, timeliness is in fact 
integrated in the concept of applicability. The latter will thus be used to this end, as knowledge 
presented at an inappropriate time (both too early and too late) will not be put to use. 
 
Timeliness emphasises the forecasting nature of intelligence. It must look sufficiently far ahead 
to remain relevant even when the consumer makes policy. Thereby, timely dissemination is 
related to intelligence prediction (returned to in chapter 5).  
 
3.6 Dissemination: Aim and Purpose 
Based on the preceding outline, the aim of the intelligence cycle's dissemination stage is to 
convey relevant, applicable and timely assessments within the consumer's sphere of need and 
interest (cf Lowenthal 2009:64), in order to reduce ambiguities in his situational awareness (SA8) 
and thus fulfil the purpose of intelligence, to put the consumer in a position where he can do 
something he otherwise could not do. For any of this to take effect, though, the dissemination 
stage must make the product accessible, thus understandable, to the consumer.  
 
The dissemination stage fulfils the aims and purpose of intelligence. It runs the last lap of the 
relay that is intelligence-making. However, and totally ruining the athletic aspect of the relay 
analogy, dissemination has little to offer beyond maintaining the position the forerunning stages 
have provided. The dissemination stage does not collect, analyse or produce intelligence. It does 
not, it can not, advance the intelligence product beyond and above the qualities of processing. 
True, bad dissemination can destroy reliability, but good dissemination can not increase it 
beyond where it was following processing. When selling cars, good salesmanship cannot 
increase the performance of a car's engine beyond what was created at the factory. The other way 
round, however, bad salesmanship can ruin a car sale. The entire intelligence process has been in 
vain if the consumer does not appreciate the message, value, relevance and applicability of an 
intelligence product (Johnson 2009:46; Betts 2003:62). 
                                                 
8
 To achieve and maintain situation awareness (SA) means that an individual or group of such are aware of current 
conditions, understand the situation's immediate impact, and even may be in a position to foresee the further 
developments from the current situation (FFOD 2007:95;176). In military terms, SA is an operational-level concept, 
but it may just as well be employed at other levels, denominating the oversight held by a decision-maker. Enabling 
the consumer to foresee how current and future development may impact on his own situation, thus allowing him to 
find measures to maintain his advantage, may be considered an aim of predictive intelligence. In this thesis, the term 
situational ambiguity denotes the opposite of SA. 
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Dissemination straddles the interface between the intra- and extra-intelligence activity, where 
intelligence products are delivered from the processing unique to the intelligence provider to the 
decision-making and implementation unique to the consumer. In the dissemination stage of the 
cycle, the output from processing is translated 'into a form which is both understandable and 
usable by the non-expert' (Hastedt, in Marrin 2009:1359). Echoing the aim and purpose of 
intelligence, again, dissemination is the craft of translating product into service. The intelligence 
analyst, qua disseminator is a bureaucrat, an adviser to the decision-maker, 'speaking truth to 
power' (Marrin 2009:136; Malnes 2009:1-2). 
 
Returning to the car sale analogy, dissemination is not merely salesmanship; it is design and 
preparation as well. This final stage between the factory and the consumer does not do anything 
with the performance of the car's engine, but it makes sure that the seats are comfortable, the 
paint job appealing and the instrument panel easy to use. However, as Herman (1996:293-296) 
points to, this may in fact indicate an alteration of the intelligence cycle: following the 
preferences of the consumer, adjustments to design and dissemination may affect the production 
process in the cycle's next revolution10. 
 
The analogy invites comparisons to other conveying, presenting and disseminating functions, 
like news anchors (they do not always write the presentations, and they certainly do not make the 
news), spokespersons (they do not decide the policies they present, but they do the writing and 
speaking, even take questions, in order to convey a message credibly), weather presenters (who 
did not make the weather, nor analysed the indicators or made the forecasts).  
 
This means that creating relevant and applicable intelligence – and disseminating it – is close to 
creating and telling a story, a dynamic of actors and aims. On the one hand the storyteller can not 
change the factual basis or conclusion of the message. On the other, he can increase interest and 
understanding – the perception of relevance and applicability – with the recipient by presenting it 
in a compelling and accessible manner. Thereby, while the dissemination stage is passive 
regarding the crafting of the intelligence message (the content of the warning or estimate), it 
                                                 
9
 The quote is originally by Glenn Hastedt, p 54 in 'The New Context of Intelligence Estimating: Politicization or 
Publicizing?', in Stephen J. Cimbala (ed.) Intelligence and Intelligence Policy in a Democratic Society, Dobbs Ferry, 
NY: Transnational Publishers Inc, 1987. 
10
 This will be briefly returned to in chapter 6, by Figure 6.1's concluding outline of the dissemination stage. 
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plays an active role in adapting the message for consumer appliance. This narrative perspective 
of intelligence dissemination will be the topic of the next chapter. 
 
3.7 Introduction to Error and Misconception in Dissemination 
3.7.1 On Error 
Having spent a chapter and a half exploring some proper qualities of intelligence dissemination, 
it is time to introduce some adversity and opposition. In intelligence, the potential for 
wrongdoing has a haunting presence (Betts 2009:87). Virtually any study on intelligence finds it 
necessary to outline its own take on the possibilities of intelligence errors11. So will this: The 
thesis will study errors in intelligence from three perspectives: 
1. Sources of error in the workings of the intelligence cycle and organisation; cognitive and 
integrity errors. The impact of these will be discussed in the remaining sections of this 
chapter. They pertain to the objectivity of the product and of the intelligence organisation, 
respectively. 
2. Sources of error in the semantic transference of intelligence; discourse failure. This pertains 
to the mental accessibility of the product, and directly affects the dissemination stage. The 
impact of discourse failure on intelligence dissemination is discussed in chapter 4. 
3. Sources of error related to the kind of content which is disseminated; epistemological 
challenges to prediction. This affects both applicability and accessibility, as it deals with the 
conveyance of s statement's reliability. It will be discussed in chapter 5.  
 
Understanding successful intelligence integrally encompasses understanding of how to avoid 
common errors identified by the trade and academically (Kuhns 2003:80; Lowenthal 2009:ch 6; 
Herman 1996:ch 13; Bar-Joseph 2005:ch 19). This implies to some degree that intelligence is 
understood by its negation; by blunders instead of adequateness. In this sense, students of 
intelligence are taught the craft in a manner similar to learning to drive by debating ever new 
ways to stall or crash the car. On the other hand, intelligence successes are not always available 
for study. One reason is the obvious concern for security and necessary secrecy. Another is the 
epistemological challenge of determining whether an intelligence prediction actually corresponds 
with the truth (cf chapter 5)12.  
                                                 
11
 Academic literature tends to refer to intelligence wrongdoings and the resulting political misunderstanding and 
inadequate political and military action as failures (cf Herman 1996:221-226). This study will primarily use the term 
error for incorrect procedure and action within the intelligence cycle, and failure for faulty procedural or political 
outcomes of these errors. The term discourse failure will be maintained in discussions in chapter 4, mainly due to 
the complexities of its cause and its effect.  
12
 This is as well why the thesis chose to approach an understanding of intelligence by its purpose in chapter 2, to 
demonstrate the qualities and effect of successful intelligence. 
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Furthermore, when attempting to identify the potential to overcome or minimize one kind of 
error, other kinds must be tested or checked for. Unsuccessful intelligence is unlikely to stem 
from one source of error only. The attacks on the US in 2001 were preceded both by analytical 
errors (the inability to collate collected information on the terrorists' tactical intention and ability) 
and discourse failure (the inability to express the threat to American civilian infrastructure). The 
misinterpretation of Iraq's WMD programme in 2003 was a result of both proximity error (the 
CIA's alleged willingness to over-represent assessments in line with the administration's political 
needs) and by cognitive error (the incomplete understanding of Curveball's position). 
 
3.7.2 Cognitive and Integrity Error 
Sources of error of the first kind on the above list erupt in the intelligence process. They tend to 
be described in either administrative or analytical terms or by such causes. Administrative errors 
are about misconduct regarding an intelligence provider's role and regarding the purpose of 
intelligence. This study will collectively refer to them as integrity errors. Analytical errors are 
about wrong, insufficient or incomplete thinking in the intelligence production process. These 
will be referred to as cognitive errors. This is not to say that one category is less abstract or more 
conscious that the other; they are not necessarily so. It is the subject matter of the error that 
differs: the role and function of intelligence versus the production of intelligence.  
 
The two next sections will in broad terms describe integrity and cognitive errors, and discuss 
their implications for the dissemination of intelligence13. As this is the last stage of the cycle, any 
possible source of error in the previous stages will necessarily inflict on it downstream14. 
 
3.8 Integrity Errors: Politicization (Proximity Error) 
Politicization implies that the intelligence organisation abstains from reporting assessments 
known or assumed to be outside of the consumer's interests, aims or perception of reality (Betts 
2003:59). It erodes integrity and objectivity, as the intelligence provider tailors reporting to the 
consumer's preferences and perception of reality, and not to its own judgement (Marrin 
2009:136). 
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 The general sources for the description and categorisation of errors include Herman 1996:ch 13; Bar-Joseph 
2005:ch 19; Neumann and Smith 2004:96. Further or more specific sources will be noted in the text when 
appropriate. The outlines in this and the next chapters are, however, condensed and selective, and do not aim at 
being a full-scale description of the intelligence error field. 
14
 And, as the process by name and nature is cyclic, any error erupting in or carried on by the dissemination stage 
will inflict on dissemination again, one cycle further on. 
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Politicization implies mixing up tasking and product dialogues, as discussions on the product's 
form and content and on the intelligence organisations further tasks are conducted in the same 
fora. The outcome is flawed inputs to the intelligence cycle, making politicization self-
reinforcing. 
 
Politicization inflicts on intelligence dissemination's conveying the 'right information' to the 
consumer. It particularly inflicts how information that has not been requested is pushed to the 
consumer, in order to fulfil intelligence's purpose. It is the double-edged sword of applicability. 
If providing applicable information gets more important to the intelligence organisation than 
providing relevant information, then the proximity of the provider to the consumer is skewed. 
The CIA has been accused of this following its input to the Bush administration before the 2003 
Iraq invasion (Marrin 2009:139-40). However, the choices that lead to such role or proximity 
error are not made by the people disseminating intelligence. They are made by those directing 
intelligence, and the decision on how to act on any intelligence assessment is obviously made by 
the consumer. 
 
The degree of closeness between intelligence providers and consumers is illustrated by the 
different positions of former head of the ONE Sherman Kent and former DCI Robert Gates15 
(Betts 2003:60-62). Kent argued that the credibility of an intelligence organisation hinged on its 
objectivity, and that this should not risk being compromised by proximity to policy-making 
processes. This implies that the intra- and extra-intelligence spheres in figures 2.1 and 2.2 should 
remain intact. Kent's view favours the relevance of the product over its applicability, meaning 
that all factors are objectively analysed at the expense of providing the decision-maker with 
intelligence tailored to his needs. While challenged in the US, Kent's view remains a cornerstone 
of intelligence organisations' self perception and claim to relevance (cf NIS 2006:6).  
 
Some decades later, Robert Gates took the position of applicability, fearing that the Kent model 
could lead the Agency to political irrelevance (Betts 2003:61; Herman 1996:109-110). As was 
the case after no WMD arsenals were found in Iraq, the Gates approach risks that an intelligence 
agency is held responsible for the political decisions of the consumer. The intra/extra-intelli-
gence spheres are breeched. But, by being overly sensitive not to care about the consumer's 
agenda and need to act politically, the Kent model risks that the disseminated product is 
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 Sherman Kent headed CIA's Office of National Estimates from 1952 to 1967, and had formative influence on the 
development of the intelligence craft in post-war USA. Robert Gates was Director of Central Intelligence between 
1991 and 1993. 
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overlooked, and thus irrelevant, in spite of its care to relevantly push objective assessments. 
Intelligence is a service, and a service without an end user is pointless (Johnson 2009:46). 
Intelligence products are in support on one particular political actor, they are not neutral (Sims 
2009:156). On the other hand, intelligence may also be a corrective, a 'devil's advocate' versus 
pre-determined policies (Omand 2007:107-08; Betts 2009:89-9016). And, as often may be the 
case when studying the extremes of a spectrum, the most fruitful approaches are usually found 
somewhere between them.  
 
3.9 Cognitive Errors: Analysis and Perception 
As phenomenon, activity and method, intelligence is a cognitive, mental process. Thereby, the 
analytical activity – of both collected single-source data and in processing of multi-source 
estimates17 – is wide open to a number of inaccuracies, misperceptions and other imperfections 
of the human mind. The literature on this kind of errors is extensive, and this short list is based 
on Bar-Joseph's (2005) and Neumann and Smith's (2004) summaries. 
 
Politically or culturally conceived world-views of individuals or groups affect and limit their 
ability to study matters neutrally and level-headedly. This makes for conscious or unconscious 
presupposition or bias, and ends up in incomplete analyses18 because of selective collection and 
interpretation of data and/or incomplete processing.  
 
The multitude of interpretation that biases may lead to, echo in some degree the Duhem-Quine 
thesis, which points to that any observed data may lead to more than one theoretical 
generalisation; so-called contrastive under-determination of data (Stanford 200919). In 
intelligence terms, this means that more than one assessment or prediction may be drawn from 
each set of collected data. Which assessment is eventually drawn may be determined by biases, 
and the result is brought into the product.  
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 Both Omand and Betts illustrate intelligence as a corrective to policy-making by similar anecdotes: a US president 
(Reagan and Johnson, respectively) makes an analogy of policy-making as milking a cow, with intelligence 
eventually ruining the milk by swinging the cow's tail trough it. Laconically and very precisely, Betts (2009:90) 
adds: 'From the point of view of the consensus-seeking politician, this was criticism; to a pure analyst, it would have 
been flattery.' 
17
 That is, analysis done in both the collection and processing stages of the intelligence cycle. 
18
 In this context, 'incomplete' or 'sub-optimal' will refer to analyses or processes that have not been carried out in 
full, meaning that there were other, available factors (which is not necessarily the same as facts) to consider or 
include. However, a 'perfect' intelligence analysis or process is unattainable, as it seldom is possible to gather all 
data or input on a particular subject.  
19
 Stanford 2009 is an entry in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, on the website of the Center for the Study of 
Language and Information, Stanford University, California, USA, and is therefore not paginated. 
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The human need for certainty and order limits the time individuals allow a problem or situation 
open to a wide spectrum of exploration or interpretation20. Delineating the discussion at a sub-
optimal point in time, may lead to cognitive closure. This may be both a prerequisite as well as a 
result of biases, and prevents information which is incompatible with the established views from 
being evaluated. Groupthink is a collective form of cognitive closure, and implies that a 
consensus or least common denominator is established within the analytical community, limiting 
awareness of situational change or factors outside the consensus. For dissemination, the outcome 
is the same as from biases: the premises of the assessment or prediction are incomplete or 
flawed. Cognitive closure is a common explanation for Aman's failure to warn Israeli authorities 
at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war in 1973 (Bar-Joseph 2005; Lowenthal 2009:324-325). 
 
Basing the (expected) behaviour of others on one's own pattern of action is referred to as mirror 
imaging (Lowenthal 2009:7-8; 120-21). In part a formal-logical error of induction, it implies an 
assumption of universality, where more than one actor will act identically given the same 
circumstances. Mirror imaging may to some extent be related to the rational actor theory in 
international relations (cf Phythian 2009:57-58; Neumann and Smith 2004). As intelligence deals 
with explaining and understanding an actor's situational self-perception and intended aims and 
actions, mirror imaging is a fundamental error, eroding the very bedrock of intelligence's 
purpose. 
 
The errors listed above can emerge in all stages of the intelligence process. Though they are 
obvious fallacies in the processing stage, such flaws of human analysis and perception are 
present in all stages of the cycle. The impact on the disseminated product is obvious, as the 
errors inflict on the premises of the analysis and assessments. Both tasking, internal and product 
dialogues are affected. The consumer and the direction stage, along with processing, contribute 
to collection plans, and analysis of single- and multi-source data are both prone to losing out on 
vital information because individual analysts and teams of such do not realise the significance of 
the collected materials at hand. In sum, there is an abundance of ways in which collection, 
analysis and processing can be affected by errors that stem from the natural and even 
unavoidable imperfect mechanisms of the human mental cognitive processes (Heuer 2006:pt III; 
Schulsky and Schmitt 2002:ch 3). 
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 Bar-Joseph (2003:182; 2005:248-251) bases his interpretation of cognitive closure on Arie Kruglanski's theories 
of lay epistemics and the concept of epistemic freezing. Bar-Joseph points to Kruglanski's 'concept of the "need for 
nonspecific closure", that is a concept that "represents the desire for a definite answer on some topic, any answer as 
opposed to confusion and ambiguity'" (Bar-Joseph 2003:182). 
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By the time cognitive errors in the intelligence product reach the dissemination stage, there is 
precariously little that can be done to mitigate them. An incomplete analysis can appear perfectly 
rational, objective, reliable and valid, and can be submitted convincingly to the consumer. An 
analysis can state, correctly, that the sky is brown, when it is based on observations on a cloud-
free, sunny day, though (consciously or unconsciously) made through dark, tinted sunglasses.  
 
In the end, nevertheless, objectivity, relevance and thereby applicability lose out. Political – not 
to mention military – actions decided on flawed information may end in fiasco. This was the case 
with the 1973 Yom Kippur war, which the Israeli side, biased by their perception of own military 
supremacy, did not conceive the Arab states as capable or willing to initiate. In several respects, 
the US' inability or unwillingness to realise Japanese ambitions in the Pacific facilitated the 1941 
attack on Pearl Harbor.  
 
Though the literature on intelligence failure is abundant with suggestions and practices to avoid 
or limit the extent of cognitive errors, (see f i Lowenthal 2009:143ff; Herman 1996:228ff), it also 
acknowledges that the risks are not likely to be permanently overcome (see f i Betts 2009).  
 
3.10 A Summary: the Most Difficult Step 
This chapter has explored the dissemination stage of the intelligence cycle. An employable 
understanding of dissemination may be expressed like this: 
– The aim of the intelligence cycle's dissemination stage is to convey relevant, applicable and 
timely assessments within the consumer's sphere of need and interest, in a manner accessible 
and understandable to him, with the purpose to reduce ambiguities in the consumer's 
situational awareness and increase the value of his basis for decision-making. 
 
The quality of intelligence dissemination is tied to three conditions: 
– Its relevance, meaning the degree to which it provides the consumer with assessments he has 
requested or needs to be made aware of. Products without relevance will be ignored by the 
consumer. 
– Its applicability, meaning the degree to which the consumer can employ the information for 
his own purposes. Non-applicable products soon lose reason and relevance for the consumer. 
– Its timeliness, the degree to which the product is still actionable for the consumer when it 
reaches him. Assessments that are overtaken by events are not applicable and thus of no 
value. 
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Intelligence products that are not disseminated in this manner lose accessibility and risk being 
ignored or left unutilised by the consumer, rendering the rather expensive intelligence process in 
vain. However, the intention of an intelligence product is not merely that the consumer should 
act upon it, but that it assists him in perceiving other factors and other information more clearly, 
thus (again) reducing his situational ambiguity. 
 
The dissemination stage is vulnerable to integral and cognitive sources of error. However, 
overcoming them cannot be done in dissemination alone. They erupt at earlier stages in the 
process, and good dissemination can only make cosmetic amendments. This last stage cannot 
increase the quality of an intelligence product beyond where it was following analysis and 
processing. However, during dissemination, the output from the processing stage is translated 
into a service to the consumer, by securing that the message is understandable and accessible to 
him. 
 
Dissemination is separated by function and aim from earlier stages of the intelligence process. In 
spite of this, the discussions of this chapter seem to doubt the stage's applicability for separate 
study. In particular, it depends on a qualitatively good processing output in order to fulfil its 
purpose. The rest of the thesis will continue the exploration of the dissemination stage with this 
aspect in mind. 
 
This chapter did primarily study what the dissemination stage is to achieve; relevance, 
applicability, timeliness. The next chapter wills study how this may be achieved, how the 
relevant, applicable and timely intelligence product is made accessible.  
 
4 Intelligence Dissemination and Narratology 
 
Speaking truth to power is notoriously difficult, 
because power often refuses to listen 
--  Loch K. Johnson 2009 (:47) 
 
4.1 Purpose and Outline 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore narratology, and discuss its implications for the 
dissemination of intelligence. The idea of storytelling – narrative communication – was 
mentioned in the previous chapter; understanding narratives may be important to make 
intelligence accessible to the decision-maker (Flyvbjerg 2001:137; Smith 2007:40). Therefore, 
this chapter will consider the relationship between intelligence dissemination and narratology – 
'how best to get an honest story honestly told' (Geertz, in Flyvbjerg 2001:1371). 
 
This will be done in three main parts. Sections 4.2 to 4.4 will describe narratology, its form and 
implications for intelligence dissemination. Returning to the potential for error in intelligence, 
section 4.5 will discuss discourse failure in dissemination. Section 4.6 will follow this discussion 
up by debating whether narrative intelligence dissemination may reduce discourse failure when 
the intelligence product concludes in adverse of the consumer's political ambitions.  
 
A main argument of this chapter is that there are several similarities between narratology and 
intelligence dissemination, but it may be debated whether this actually constitutes news or real 
progress in understanding the latter. A narrative format alone can not overcome challenges put to 
dissemination. Studying features of narratives can, however, provide useful perspectives on 
accessible, applicable intelligence dissemination.  
 
4.2 Narratology 
Intelligence needs to be disseminated convincingly, Herman (1996:46) implies: 'Salesmanship is 
part of the game'. While intelligence should refrain from any recommendation on policy 
(Lowenthal 2009:3-5), chapter 3 argued that intelligence products need a sound presentation in 
order to resonate with the decision-maker. This implies a relationship of trust (Herman 1996:45). 
This is based not only on the intelligence provider's track record, but as well on how intelligence 
products are substantiated and disseminated (Marrin 2009:137-138). The applicability of an 
intelligence product depends on whether the consumer understands the premises of the 
assessment (Johnson 2009:46-47). As will be returned to in chapter 5, this maintains reliability 
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 The quote is originally from Clifford Geertz' Works and Lives: the Anthropologist as Author, Stanford. CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1998, p 9. 
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from processing through dissemination. It contributes to accessibility, to being understood, to 
convince the decision-maker of the applicability of the product. 
 
However, intelligence products are not decision-makers' only source for situational awareness. 
Other sources and considerations influence them as well (Johnson 2009:47), and while 
intelligence may not be more truthful or important, a lot of resources are wasted if intelligence 
products are left irrelevant for the consumer's policy. Sir Rupert Smith (2005:284-285) illustrates 
how media influence both the public and the decision-maker, and points to the need to 'write a 
more compelling script' (2007:40). To present an argument or assessment in such a manner that 
people draw conclusions from and act on it, to succeed in the 'narrative battle' (Freedman 
2006:75;78), are similar to the purpose of intelligence dissemination (Hagen 2009).  
 
Narratology is the study of the structure and impact of narrative forms (Felluga 2003; Jahn 
20052; Flyvbjerg 2001:137). Freedman (2006:22) defines a narrative in strategic 
communications3 as 'compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from 
which inferences can be drawn.' Jahn (2005) points out that  
 
'[…] all narratives present a story. A story is a sequence of events which involves characters. 
Hence, a narrative is a form of communication which presents a sequence of events caused and 
experienced by characters.'  
 
Both understandings illustrate some common features between narrative storytelling and 
intelligence dissemination. While Jahn emphasises the features of the narrative (a sequential 
story, actors, actions and consequence), Freedman emphasises the consequences, inferences, of 
the narrative for the audience – the consumer. This invites two discussions, on the content of the 
narrative, and on its implications. The next two sections will take the discussions on4.  
                                                 
2
 Felluga 2003 and Jahn 2005 are both tutorial texts posted on the websites of College of Liberal Arts, Purdue 
University, Indiana, USA, and English Department, University of Cologne, Germany, respectively. The sources are 
therefore not paginated. 
3
 And, to be thorough, communication can be defined as 'the sharing of meaning through the exchange of 
information' (Castells 2009:54). This thesis is mostly about 'sharing' (form) and 'meaning' (content). 
4
 A note on terminology: A narrative is a form of communication or dissemination – a way of promoting a message, 
a story. Narratology is the study of narratives. This thesis will employ the two terms similarly when it comes to the 
impact or lessons of studying or employing a narrative form. However, intelligence cannot be 'disseminated 
narratologically'. Occasionally, the terms 'narrative dissemination' or 'intelligence narrative' are used to denote 
intelligence dissemination that apply (consciously or not) elements that are re-found in narratives or narratology.  
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4.3 Narratives and Intelligence Dissemination: Story, Agency, Structure 
Jahn's understanding of a narrative points to its internal features: a story, a sequence of events, 
experienced by actors. Intelligence products assess developments and actors that inflict on the 
decision-maker's position. They may be disseminated sequentially, emphasising how one 
development lead to another. An 'intelligence narrative' may thus present a sequence of events 
caused or initiated by specific actors or conditions, and experienced by those actors and by the 
decision-maker. This may aid in emphasising the premises of the assessment. 
 
Furthermore, Jahn points to characters, actors, as what provides the dynamics of the narrative 
storyline. This introduces the agency-structure problem, which persists in both intelligence and 
social science: where to look for explanations in analyses and processing, and what to emphasise 
when establishing understanding in dissemination (cf Malnes 2008:159-160; Ulfving 2002:91-
92). Actors are able to make motivated choices inflicting on their surroundings. These 
surroundings may be structural, but they are as well institutions and mechanisms, created by or 
made up of other actors. The structures create a framework the actor must adapt to rather than 
overcome (Hovi and Rasch 1996:84-85; Grimen 2004:ch 9). The understanding of the interplay 
between agents and structures provides fruitful inputs to both social science and intelligence 
analyses. Intelligence may successfully combine structural and agency considerations, and 
present assessments of how a given actor and his environment will inflict on the decision-
maker's situation (Ulfving 2002:92). 
 
A regular threat assessment may illustrate this. An assessment of a potential threat is made up of 
a multiplicative equation of the adversary actor's capabilities (structural; man-made and nature-
given, secrets) and intentions (un-materialised; embedded within the agent, mysteries). Analysis 
of one part of the equation is meaningless without considering the other. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Agency and structure in a threat assessment (example from Gulf Region early 1990). 
 
 
Likely that Iraq will attack 
Kuwait to secure natural 
resources and end debt 
Threat 
Assessment 
 Superior military force 
 Securing Kuwait will 
recover Iraqi economy 
(Iraq financed the war 
on Iran by loans from 
Kuwait) 
 Coastline and natural 
resources will make 
Iraq regional great 
power 
 No interference from 
Arab states or Soviet 
Union expected 
Actor Structure 
Intention Capability 
x = 
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This demonstrates how a combination of structural and agency considerations are necessary in 
order to produce a reliable intelligence assessment. Intelligence products benefit little from 
purely individualistic or collectivistic methods; agent-less structures or structure-less agents do 
not present all the relevant premises of the conclusion (Ulfving 2002:92; cf Grimen 2004 ch 9). 
This reciprocal interaction between agent and structure is part of what Bent Flyvbjerg 
(2001:137-40; cf Schatzki 2006:126-127) calls phronetic social science. Flyvbjerg (2001:138) 
argues that:  
 
'Phronetic researchers deliberately seek out information for answering questions about what 
structural factors influence individual actions, how those actions are constructed, and their 
structural consequences.'  
 
The same can be said of intelligence analysts (Ulfving 2002:92). 
 
This discussion illustrates two matters: 
– The terminology may be slightly different, but the job done by a narrative and by 
disseminating an intelligence product is similar: Telling a story in order to convince a 
recipient that the presentation is of value. Narratology does in this respect not add significant 
new insight to dissemination. 
– The agency-structure discussion pertains just as much to the processing stage as to the 
dissemination stage. The former considers both agency and structural data to construct an 
assessment. Narratology aids thus slightly in delineating between processing and 
dissemination, or rather, illustrating how the latter springs from the former5. 
 
4.4 Narratives and Intelligence Dissemination: Applicability for the Consumer 
Freedman's definition, while maintaining the aspects of compelling story lines, includes the 
aspect of the narrative's implications, which Jahr's does not. Adding value to the consumer's 
situational awareness is likewise the purpose of intelligence. Freedman's approach reflects this 
similarity, and that it is the take-away from the narrative format that is important, not the form 
itself. The latter is merely a means to reach an end. Narrative intelligence dissemination may 
stand out in the decision-maker's stream of information (cf Castells 2009:142-144), and may 
avoid him ignoring or missing significant analyses due to what Johnson (2009:48) calls 'other 
pressing concerns'. 
 
                                                 
5
 Which, given the intelligence cycle in figure 2.2, really is not much of an insight, either. 
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Intelligence processing includes a plethora of factors and data, agents and structures, in an 
attempt at creating objective, thorough analyses, free of cognitive error. When disseminating the 
analysis, the narrative approach, still honest to the output of processing, deductively 'selects' how 
and when to convey the output (cf Lowenthal 2009:128-29)6. Dissemination's aim is to 'explain 
events convincingly' (cf Freedman 2006:22), thus empowering the decision-maker to draw 
inferences and act to secure a relative advantage (Phythian 2009:57). 
 
This perspective returns to the understanding of intelligence dissemination outlined in chapter 3. 
Dissemination ensures the accessibility of the product, and translates it into a service for the 
decision-maker. All findings, all conclusions at the processing stage do not find their way into 
the disseminated product. The product is adapted to the needs of the consumer. Through internal 
vetting, it is made as applicable as the provider can make it (see a o Betts 2009:100-01; 
Lowenthal 2009:139-40) 7. The ensuing narrative is a balance between what the consumer asked 
for ('pulled' in the tasking dialogue) and what the provider finds relevant to add ('push', a.o. 
through the product dialogue).  
 
Dissemination, like a narrative, can 'link certain events while disentangling others', in order to 
'explain events convincingly' (Freedman 2006:22-23). Thereby, the narrative perspective 
increases the understanding of how intelligence dissemination makes processed intelligence 
accessible to the consumer.  
 
4.5 Narratology and Discourse Failure 
Chapter 3 discussed the potential for conceptual and integrity error in the intelligence process. 
This chapter has shown that intelligence dissemination contains narrative elements. It may 
therefore be worthwhile to view narrative dissemination in the light of misconceptions that may 
erupt in the actual semantic transference of information and understanding. This section will 
study the impact of discourse failure, as outlined by Neumann and Smith (2004), on the 
conveyance of accuracy and understanding in the relationship between the intelligence provider 
and consumer. 
                                                 
6
 This, by the way, is why brevity is hard to achieve when analysts prepare their own dissemination (Lowenthal 
2009:147). The analyst can simply not refrain from putting forth all nuances of her work, while the decision-maker 
most often only has time for the highlights. 
7
 This, of course, runs the risk of integrity error, if assessments or information that the consumer 'would not like to 
hear' are deleted. In order to reduce this risk, internal vetting may focus on 'what the consumer should (endure to) 
hear', rather than what he would prefer to avoid listening to. 
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4.5.1 Discourse Failure 
Neumann and Smith (2004:96) define discourse failure as '[…] the constriction of the language 
and vocabulary to identify, analyze, and accept that a significant threat exist[s]'. A discourse can 
be understood as an applied framework for actors' communication (Flyvbjerg 2001:123-24). In 
intelligence dissemination, a discourse between the intelligence provider and consumer is an 
outcome of the content, language8 and inherent expectations and sublime understandings in the 
three intelligence dialogues (see section 2.6). It is the context of language that an intelligence 
product is delivered in. It forms the basis for the resulting understanding with the consumer. 
When this framework is inaccurate or not understood similarly at both ends9, intelligence 
dissemination can not serve its purpose. Or worse; it is counterproductive, in that the consumer is 
left with a mirage. 
 
Discourse failure amplifies any other errors present in the intelligence process. The causes of 
discourse failure are not necessarily found at any one stage in the intelligence cycle. Language 
and context exist between the stages. Discourse failure can be understood as a dysfunctional 
language-contextual frame of reference, within the intelligence organisation, with the decision-
maker or between the two.  
 
The 2001 attacks on the USA may serve as an example. The failure of the US intelligence 
community to collect, collate and convey domestic threats before September 11th 2001 was 
enhanced by discourse failure. The language to express hijacking and crashing of fully loaded 
civilian aircraft into populated buildings did exist on September 10th. The words were there, it 
was possible to create and present this version of the future (Johnson 2009:47). But the proper 
discourse was not present, there was no context, no understanding in which to construct or 
express the scenario, both within the intelligence community and between the community and 
the consumer. Thus, it never was, and by September 12th, hindsight had made the scenario 
grimly obvious (cf Goodman 2005:60). 
 
4.5.2 Causes and Expressions 
Discourse failure may be caused or created by a pre-determined position or agenda in one of the 
parties to the discourse. Pre-determination of policy with the decision-maker can, according to 
Neumann and Smith (2004:98-106) emerge from the (political) left or right: 
                                                 
8
 Language, in this context, has of course nothing to do with grammar, syntax or linguistic knowledge. It has, as will 
be shown below, to do with the epistemic and conceptual reference of the language, words and syntax. 
9
 The 'Mars and Venus' terminology in interpersonal relationships similarly indicate divergent discourses – a 
discourse failure. 
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– Discourse failure on the left is understood as an overly benign understanding of sub-state 
actors and anti-western attitudes, as was displayed by i.e. the Clinton administration in the 
1990s. This resulted in an under-estimation of the threat from f.i. al-Qaida. 
– Discourse failure on the right is understood as a lack of comprehension that sub-state actors 
like al-Qaida could constitute a persistent threat without extensive support and direction from 
a state proper, as was displayed i.e. by the Bush administration both before and after 
September 2001 (Neumann and Smith 2004:103-05).  
 
Furthermore, depending on which account the discourse is inaccurate, discourse failure can take 
epistemic or conceptual form10. Epistemic discourse failure reflects a mismatch between the 
applied wording and reality. Conspiracy theories may be an example11; assuming that something 
exists where it does not. In understanding the intentions of a counterpart, misinterpretations of 
agency or structural indicators may lead to over-estimation of threat. Epistemic discourse failure 
was manifested on the right in 2003, when the US administration made its case for an Iraqi 
WMD programme and for a working link between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaida. Policy over-
rode (lack of) evidence (Neumann and Smith 2004:105)12. 
 
Epistemic discourse failure may express itself inside the intelligence sphere, like a bias or other 
cognitive errors: If the intelligence organisation is culturally liable to overestimate the malicious 
intentions of one particular actor, this will lead to incomplete, flawed analyses. Furthermore, 
epistemic discourse failure may as well be the inversion of bias or conspiracy theories; seeing 
nothing where harmful intentions in fact are – as in discourse failure on the left (the US' 
ignorance of Japanese intentions in late 1941 may, again, serve as an example).  
 
Conceptual discourse failure reflects a mismatch between the applied wording and the 
interpretation of the words. Before September 2001, anti-US terrorism seemed to be commonly 
understood as small-scale or executed overseas13. The terrorism discourse did not allow for the 
term to include asymmetric armament and methods, nor targets on US soil. The discourse failure 
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 This dichotomy was first outlined by Raino Malnes, and I am grateful for being allowed to borrow it. 
11
 At least the faulty ones.  
12
 Neumann and Smith (2004) hint at the influence of classic realism in the study of international relations as a cause 
of discourse failure on the right. In this respect, these understandings of pre-determined context in the intelligence 
provider-consumer relationship are related to the level of analysis issue; where to look in order to find what explains 
developments, threats and opportunities in international relations. Realists consider states the acting unit of the 
international system, and discourse failure on the right fails to see nuances beyond that. It is, however, not a task of 
this thesis to study how any approach to international relations may inflict on intelligence matters (cf Phythian 2009; 
Malnes 2008:7-8). 
13
 With the exception of home-grown terrorism; the Oklahoma City attack in 1995 was not small-scale or abroad. 
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on the left in the 1990s likewise failed to attribute the fitting label ('threat') to movements like al-
Qaida. It may be argued that, had the west engaged al-Qaida militarily or politically in the 1990s, 
the potency of the organisation in the 2000s may have become severely reduced (Neumann and 
Smith 2004:102). 
 
The next section will discuss whether narrative forms do intelligence dissemination any favours 
in the face of discourse failure and pre-determined policy. 
 
4.6 Narrative Intelligence Dissemination, Discourse Failure and Pre-determined Policy 
By default, policy-makers have policies. In a democratic society, a majority of the informed 
voters ratify this policy by regular intervals. The Clinton administration's discourse failure on the 
left and the Bush administration's ditto on the right were sanctioned twice each by US voters. 
Therefore, as was mentioned in chapter 3, it is challenging to convey assessments that are not in 
concordance with the desired policy (Johnson 2009:47-48).  
 
The intelligence cycle (as described in chapter 2) is constructed on the assumption that decision-
makers do not make policy before evaluating intelligence inputs. Stephen Marrin (2009:136ff) 
argues that this assumption is incorrect, and the pre-determination of policy implicit in discourse 
failure supports his argument. This section will discuss whether narrative intelligence 
dissemination can dull, if not overcome, such political adversity.  
 
Addressing political adversity is about presenting assessments that are unfamiliar to the decision-
maker's world view. Narratives are contextual, and start on 'common ground' (Flyvbjerg 
2001:137; Freedman 2006:90). In dissemination, the intelligence analyst can make a conscious, 
deductive choice of where to form the basis of the conveyed product. This may reduce the risk of 
conceptual discourse failure, which evolves from a lack of common context. It does not change 
the assessment to please the consumer, the designs it to be understandable to him. 
 
However, in order to know 'where to start', the intelligence provider must be familiar with the 
decision-maker's position, in order to choose contextual factors within his perceptive range. This 
line of argument highlights the Gates model of proximity, as well as the tasking and product 
dialogues between the intelligence consumer and provider (cf Neumann and Smith 2004:106-07; 
Hagen 2009).  
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Epistemic discourse failure, however, evolves from a lack of understanding of factual intentions 
or abilities of an (adversary) actor, which may lead to over- or under-representation of the threat 
he poses (cf Neumann and Smith's definition of discourse failure and the outline of a threat 
assessment in figure 4.1). The narrative's ability to convey understanding of an actor's intentions 
and structural constraints can alleviate this (cf von Wright 1971:5-7; Flyvbjerg 2001:70-71). 
 
Intelligence can furthermore shape the discourse early, before other sources engage in the 
narrative battle for the heart and mind of the decision-maker. Disseminating products early 
displaces the battle, making intelligence stand out, allowing it to 'capture the narrative' (Smith 
2007:40) and to serve its purpose. Intelligence can achieve this for two reasons: 
– Intelligence is an institutionalised service, dedicated to the decision-maker's purpose14. The 
tasking dialogue thus puts intelligence ahead regarding what the consumer needs.  
– The uniqueness of its sources (cf Lowenthal 2009:111), which makes data available for 
analysis and subsequent dissemination at an earlier stage than intelligence's competitors in 
the narrative battle.  
 
Such reliance on the form of dissemination may, however, be a false promise. Context and 
understanding is constructed by the preceding processing, not by the form or time of dissemi-
nation. The narrative form helps, though, in 'thinking outside the box' in order to break discourse 
failure, by linking and disentangling factors (Freedman 2006:23). It attains its compelling power 
by selecting premises for a conclusion or prediction, but the process also risks 'settling' a topic 
prematurely. Such convincing story lines may increase an epistemic discourse failure, where the 
story compellingly reinforces a misconception of reality (cf Laitin 2006:48-49), which can have 
evolved from a cognitive error at earlier stages of the intelligence cycle. 
 
Therefore, narrative dissemination can be leading the consumer from one 'box', one mindset, to 
another. Nassim N. Taleb (2007:308-09) refers to a similar concern as a narrative fallacy; where 
the need for confirmation and order (cognitive closure) leads to a narrative being retro-fitted to 
scarce or insufficient data. Narrative intelligence dissemination may thereby turn out to be both a 
helpful tool and a risk, bringing the provider-consumer discourse out of an inadequate 
framework, but just as easily into renewed cognitive closure or discourse failure. 
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 This may sound like politicization. It is not. The intelligence organisation exists for – and is funded by – the 
decision-maker, and is thus a tool in his policy-making. This is an institutionalised relationship, and just as the 
intelligence organisation is directed to provide a service to the decision-maker, the latter needs to inform the 
organisation about his needs at the earliest possible time (cf Sims 2009:154-56). 
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4.7 A Summary: Notoriously Difficult? 
This chapter has explored narratology in the context of intelligence dissemination, and discussed 
the usefulness of a narrative approach in mitigating faulty discourses in the intelligence provider-
consumer relationship. In intelligence dissemination, a narrative can be understood as a 
consistent story line emphasising the possible outcomes of a dynamic agency-structure interplay, 
from which the consumer may draw conclusions that aid in his decision-making. A narrative 
may aid in making the disseminated product accessible. It becomes easier to understand and thus 
to apply for the non-expert (cf Marrin 2009:135). 
 
The value of a narrative as a tool in dissemination or as a frame of reference to understand 
dissemination has been discussed against discourse failure. Combining findings on intelligence 
dissemination and narratology has some merit in overcoming discourse failure manifested as a 
pre-determined political ambition with the decision-maker. When intelligence products are 
disseminated to a non-receptive consumer, narrative intelligence dissemination can alleviate 
conceptual and epistemic discourse failure by 
– establishing a common, contextual frame of reference between the provider and consumer of 
intelligence,  
– disseminating an understanding of other actors' intentions, and 
– do this early and timely enough to shape the discourse and win the narrative battle. 
 
However, narrative dissemination is merely a form element, and remains a double-edged sword. 
It can bring the discourse out of an inadequate framework, but can just as easily close the 
contextual framework again, ending in renewed cognitive closure or discourse failure. 
 
The chapter may thus conclude that narratives are not all-powerful tools that can aid in all of 
intelligence dissemination's problems. Narratology is a complementary approach, not an 
alternative to the findings of chapter 3. However, discussing narratives in intelligence 
dissemination enhances several possibilities, terms and obscurities, and the understanding of 
intelligence dissemination may be better off for it.  
 
5 Intelligence Dissemination and Prediction 
 
By knowing things that exist, you can know that which does not exist. 
--  Miyamoto Musashi, Gorin no Sho, the Book of the Void, 1645 
 
5.1 Purpose and Outline 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore prediction in science and intelligence, in order to 
demonstrate what needs to be disseminated to support a predictive statement. The chapter will 
study the premises that make predictions reliable in an Inductive-Probabilistic model, and how 
intelligence predictions are disseminated in a manner which preserves their reliability. This may 
elucidate the character of dissemination by studying the actual product, as well as the challenges 
connected to disseminating it.  
 
This will be done in three main parts. Sections 5.2 to 5.4 will describe scientific prediction, the 
epistemological challenges to it, and briefly outline von Wright's Inductive-Probabilistic model 
for prediction. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 will introduce some concepts of intelligence predictions, and 
show how narratology ties in to elucidate the premises that support a predictive intelligence 
conclusion. Section 5.7 will finalise the thesis' analyses by discussing whether narratology 
implies that the product's convincing ability has more merit to the consumer than its truth. 
 
A main argument of this chapter is that a intelligence prediction is founded on a context familiar 
to both the provider and consumer. The uncertainty of the predicted development is explicitly 
stated, and the prediction arcs from context to conclusion via this probabilistic conditioning. 
Therefore, the reliability of a prediction can be maintained, in spite of it remaining inductive and 
uncertain. Nevertheless, there may be instances where the applicability of predictive intelligence 
sometimes may be a better measure of success than its degree of truth. 
 
5.2 Prediction: Definition and Typology 
Prediction is, along with description and explanation, one of three functions of science (Hovi and 
Rasch 1996:123; Kuhns 2003:85). Hovi and Rasch (1996:123) define prediction as a 'justified 
statement which forecast at least one observation which is not already known to the person 
making the prediction'1, and emphasise the need for an accompanying analysis justifying the 
statement's degree of probability. Their definition also covers retrodictions, statements about 
unknown factors of the past.  
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 My translation. 
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Hovi and Rasch (1996:124-129;133-137) add two typologies to the concept of scientific 
prediction. Depending on its justification, a prediction can be 
– based on a pre-observed empiric regularity;  
– a forecasting based on theoretic reason; or  
– a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
And, depending on its degree of stated certainty, it can be  
– deterministic, absolute and unconditioned; or 
– probabilistic, uncertain and conditioned. 
 
This chapter will study intelligence predictions as probabilistic, based on theoretic reason or 
empiric regularity. As it is the decision-maker, not the intelligence agency, who may decide 
action and thereby influence future events, the prospect of intelligence predictions as self-
fulfilling prophecies may for this study be ruled out.  
 
Predictions based on observed regularity are founded on inductive reasoning, generating an 
estimate of future development from the outcomes of previous, similar events (cf Kuhns 
2003:88). Predictions based on theoretical reason assess future outcome based on an inductive2 
development from pre-suppositions, indicators3 and hypotheses (which, in the Popperian sense, 
are not yet falsified)4. 
 
5.3 Knowledge, Truth, Validity and Reliability 
'Intelligence is really little more that useful knowledge – useful to the policymaker – and 
epistemology is the study of knowledge' Kuhns (2003:81) states. Hovi and Rasch's definition of 
prediction states that a predictive statement is about an entity which is not known, and therefore 
needs to be justified. Knowledge is commonly understood as a justified, true belief (Malnes 
2008:97). These approaches point to the need for justification, in order to make a prediction 
                                                 
2
 In theory about the advancement of knowledge, an inductive approach implies generating theories or 
generalisations on the basis of a limited number of observations (f.i., concluding that all swans are white after 
observing 50, 100 or 1000 swans). In spite of any applicable conclusions drawn from them, inductions may 
eventually turn out wrong (the Earth is not flat, and it is not at the centre of the solar system), as they do not 
conserve truth. The opposite is done in deduction, which aims to maintain truth by concluding on the specific from 
the general (f.i., swans are birds, as they have two wings, reproduce via eggs and are bipedal, all of which are 
defining characteristics of birds). A deduction cannot be wrong, because its antecedents are correct (a 'swan' that 
does not reproduce egg-wise, have more than two legs and no wings, would thus not be a swan at all) (cf Jacobsen 
2005:28-29; Popper 1960:16-17). 
3
 The I&W methodology mentioned in chapter 2 may be assessed as predictions (warnings) based on theoretic 
reason: the hypothesis that a given set of indicators will pre-determine and forego another, specific event 
(McDevitt). 
4
 Predictions are naturally inductive, as they are about future (or, as in Hovi and Rasch's definition, at least about the 
unknown). It is logically impossible to deduce from the truthfulness of present observations to the unknown future. 
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understandable to the recipient. An intelligence prediction, therefore, is challenged its degree of 
truthfulness; by its validity and reliability. 
 
Truth is a concept open to some epistemological debate (cf Kirkham 1995), it will for the 
purpose of this thesis simply be understood as a corresponding relationship between a statement 
and the phenomenon the statement describes5 (Malnes 2008:96; Kirkham 1995:ch 4).  
 
The validity of a scientific statement or conclusion denotes the degree to which it corresponds 
with (the observable) reality – the social or historical phenomenon it describes, explains or 
predicts. In qualitative social science, validity is often understood as the statement's credibility 
and trustworthiness (Creswell 2009:190-91; Repstad 2007:134-35). In prediction, therefore, 
validity translates to whether the predicted development actually takes place. This can only be 
determined retrospectively, at which point any validity inquiry will no longer deal with 
prediction, but with the explanation of a historical occurrence. Assuring validity in prediction is 
therefore closing on the logically impossible (Kuhns 2003:93).  
 
The reliability of a scientific statement or conclusion denotes the degree to which it evolves 
justifiably and transparently from its premises. In qualitative social science, reliability is often 
understood as others' ability to corroborate the statement; in effect, to which degree the reader is 
justified in assuming that the conclusion is correct, given the available data or premises (Repstad 
2007:134-35; Creswell 2009:190-94; Johnson 2009:466). In prediction, reliability concerns two 
matters: 
– whether the current events that may lead to the predicted conclusion are true, and 
– whether the premises of the predictive statement justify – lead logically to – it.  
In short, reliability in prediction is the foundation for a prediction's epistemological success, and 
depends on whether the prediction is drawn from indicators sufficiently relevant to it (cf Handel 
2003:20; Hovi and Rasch 1996:124)7.  
 
Assuring the reliability of a predictive statement may be somewhat more subjective, and 
dependent on what the consumer deems credible. Basically, a statement's credibility to the 
consumer depends on whether it is sufficiently in correspondence with his present knowledge 
                                                 
5
 This is in essence what is known as the correspondence theory of truth.  
6
 Johnson (2009:46-47) uses accuracy to similar ends as reliability, and points to this as one of four qualities of 
intelligence dissemination, along with relevance, timeliness and applicability. 
7
 In I&W methodology, the reliability of the predictive statement rests with the necessity, clarity and visibility of the 
indicators (see section 2.8).  
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and perceptions (Malnes 2008:111-12). The closer the prediction is to the familiar, the more 
likely it is to be found reliable, and vice versa. This, of course, is a challenge to intelligence 
dissemination. Too far away from the familiar, and relevance and applicability is lost; too close 
to current perception, and intelligence runs the risk of proximity error. 
 
5.4 Anatomy of Prediction: the Inductive-Probabilistic Model 
This chapter has shown that a predictive statement must be justified in order to make it credible 
and thereby applicable to the consumer. As intelligence predictions are probabilistic (Marrin 
2009:143; Lowenthal 2009:131-33), they need, as part of their justification, a statement that 
sums up both the analyst's confidence in its premises, and (thereby) in the conclusion drawn on 
this basis (t.i. the reliability of the statement). In terms of the intelligence cycle, however, this 
concerns the craft of intelligence processing; how a prediction is constructed. 
 
In order to explore what needs to be disseminated in order to support a predictive conclusion, 
this section will take one step back from intelligence dissemination and study an approach to the 
processing of a prediction. As an example of how a predictive statement may be reliably 
constructed, this section will in brief terms describe the Inductive-Probabilistic model for 
prediction, as developed by Georg Henrik von Wright.  
 
The objective of the example is to show how the contextual and justifying premises need to be 
carried into the presentation of a predictive conclusion in order to maintain its reliability8.  
 
Von Wright took Carl Gustav Hempel's Deductive-Nomological model as a point of departure. 
This model intended to explain a foregone event by outlining its antecedents: its contextual 
circumstance and the effect of a (inductively reasoned) covering law for this particular instance 
(Hovi and Rasch 1996:41; Grimen 2004:183). Hempel's famous example was based on: the 
contextual circumstance C, leaving a car in sub-zero temperature with its radiator brimming with 
water, and the covering law L, that water freezes and expands its mass at such temperature. 
Together, these premises produced, and thereby explained, the event E: the ruptured, leaking car 
radiator the following morning9.  
                                                 
8
 Von Wright (1971:11-12) refers to the premises of the explanation or prediction as basis or antecedents. In this 
thesis, the term premise is used to the same end: to denominate what here is shown as C and L/Lp, or in intelligence, 
considerations forerunning a prediction.  
9
 The contextual preconditions may as well be split in two: one general (there is a lot of water in the radiator) and 
one specific 'trigger' (the temperature drops below 0 °C) (Gilje and Grimen 1993:109-13). As the purpose of the 
example is to show the evolution of the model by von Wright, it will stick to the regular version. 
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Georg Henrik von Wright (1971:11;13-15) presents an adaptation of Hempel which he calls an 
Inductive-Probabilistic model for prediction. In Hovi and Rasch's typology, this approach is 
probabilistic and based on empiric regularity. Using similar terminology as the covering law 
model, von Wright (1971:13) explains: 
 
'The object of an inductive-probabilistic explanation, too, is an individual event E. The basis is a 
set of other events or states E1,…, Em. The covering law, the "bridge" or "tie" connecting the basis 
with the object of explanation, is a probability-hypothesis to the effect that on an occasion when 
E1,…, Em are instantiated, it is highly probable that E will occur.' 
 
Applied to the same example as Hempel, with p indicating a degree of probability of the 
regularity of the law, the Inductive-Probabilistic model would be10 
 
Explanans:   C1, C2, C3…Cn  Water-filled radiator in sub-zero temperature 
Probabilistic law:  Lp1, Lp2, Lp3…Lpn  Water has previously frozen and expanded in  
      sub-zero temperature 
Explanandum:  Epx   The radiator will break, with x probability. 
 
Von Wright points to the bridging nature of the law. It leads the reasoning from the contextual 
events C to the unknown event E. In this respect, it adds transparency to scientific prediction, 
and the method increases the predictive conclusion's reliability. Its validity would still depend on 
the degree of probability versus the factual outcome. 
 
At the same time, the law allows for inductive reasoning, from the known C to the unknown E. It 
merely adds the possibility for and acceptance of 'that E might have failed to occur' (von Wright 
1971:13). To Karl Popper, this uncertainty is not only acceptable; it is the keystone of science. 
The potential that the next observation of water at a temperature below 0 °C (Lpn) will not 
involve expansion of mass; the potential that the law is falsified, is to Popper the very thing that 
would make this three-part argument scientifically acceptable (Kuhns 2003:86ff; Skirbekk and 
Gilje 1987:301-02; cf Popper 1960:33-38). 
 
5.5 Prediction in Intelligence 
Quoting Nicholas Rescher11, Kuhns (2003:85) states that  
 
'[…] an intelligence forecast, like one made in science, should be a "rational prediction that is based on 
grounds whose merits are discernible prior to the event … Predictions whose merits are discernable only 
after the fact are useless."'. 
 
                                                 
10
 For consistency and simplicity, the lettering C and L from Hempel's model is retained, rather than von Wright's E 
and p. 
11
 Kuhns quotes Rescher's contribution on prediction in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), which I unfortunately have not had the opportunity to study. 
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Rescher's approach to intelligence predictions echo both scientific prediction and intelligence 
dissemination: 
– 'Discernible grounds' are re-found in the premises of a predictive statement. 
– Predictive intelligence, like any intelligence product, must be timely in order to be applicable 
(cf chapter 3); it must be brought to the consumer when he needs it, as, obviously, 
predictions must be made before the fact. 
 
Chapter 2 showed that prediction is integral to intelligence (Hagen 2009). This section will 
outline how prediction is integrated in intelligence, and give a simplified example of how the 
Inductive-Probabilistic method is echoed in intelligence products. 
 
5.5.1 Uncovering the Unknown 
Returning to Sherman Kent's categories of intelligence output, prediction is re-found in 
speculative-evaluative and current-reportorial intelligence. The latter kind forecasts into the 
rather near future, but longer-term prediction is the mainstay of speculative-evaluative 
intelligence. Intelligence predictions, therefore, always need approaches that improve the 
possibility to observe and uncover that 'which is not already known to' the analyst (cf Hovi and 
Rasch's definition).  
 
Kent as well distinguished between three types of intelligence statements (Kuhns 2003:84):  
– indisputable facts;  
– the knowable, but unknown; and  
– the unknown. 
Predictive intelligence assesses the unknown and presently unknowable.  
 
Simplifying further, Robert Gates dichotomised intelligence's focus into 'secrets' and 'mysteries' 
(Herman 1996:103; 2002:11).  
– Secrets are known to some, but hidden; thus, potentially knowable.  
– Mysteries are not known by any, and thus presently unknowable.  
A state's order of battle, the location of a terrorist's safe haven, a doctrine, a conscious intention – 
all these are secrets. Uncovering them may take investigation, good collection and prudent 
interpretation of the collected information (Ulfving 2002:83-84). How a state will fare militarily 
in conflict next week, how the terrorist will operate from the safe haven, how the doctrine and 
the intentions will be implemented – these are mysteries. Uncovering them is impossible. Unlike 
--  61  -- 
the secrets, they are not existing entities12. Predictive intelligence may however assess these 
developments, by studying their corresponding secrets, and as Hovi and Rasch's definition 
indicated, make justified statements about the unknown. 
 
Gates' dichotomy of secrets and mysteries reflects von Wright's (1971) studies on scientific 
inquiry. On the distinction between explanation and prediction, he wrote: 'Prediction looks 
forward from what is to what will come, explanation usually looks back from what is to what 
went before' (von Wright 1971:1-2). As the latter may be revealed through the study of truthful 
correspondence (Malnes 1996:3), it relates to positivism, the Gallilean tradition (von Wright 
1971:2-4) and to Gates' secrets, the uncovering of the hidden, the knowable. This knowledge 
contributes to the contextual conditions for the prediction. 
 
Prediction, on the other hand, is in von Wright's view (1971:2;5-7) related to the Aristotelian 
epistemological tradition and to the qualities of understanding (cf Flyvbjerg 2001:70-71; 
2006:73). Understanding 'the aims and purposes of an agent' involves a 'form of empathy […] or 
re-creation in the mind of the scholar of the mental atmosphere, the thoughts and feelings and 
motivations, of the objects of his study' and is 'connected with intentionality in a way explanation 
is not' (von Wright 1971:6). These are as good statements on the purpose of intelligence and 
intelligence analysis as any (cf Herman 1996:106-107; Johnson 2009:41-42; Ulfving 2002:81).  
 
5.5.2 Construction of an IPB 
Intelligence Preparation of the Battle-space (IPB) may serve as a demonstration of the Inductive-
Probabilistic aspect of an intelligence prediction13. In operational-level intelligence, the IPB 
produces and maintains assessments of interest to own forces and operations in a given area. It is 
done by three sequential stages: 
1. Description of the area of operations, in order to evaluate its effects (including both mental 
and physical constants) on plans and operations. 
2. Threat evaluation, in order to assess how any adversary, neutral or friendly actor in the area 
ordinarily operates. 
                                                 
12
 Intelligence collection can only gather data on the existing, secrets at best. It takes analysis and processing to enter 
into mysteries and prediction. The Inductive-Probabilistic model demonstrated one approach to the latter in science. 
These principles are just as employable in intelligence processing. 
13
 The sources for this information are a.o. FR 3-1 2003:77ff; Ulfving 2002:79-81 and FFOD 2007:147. The outline 
is much simplified (a.o., it is often described in four, rather than three phases (here, the defining of the battle-space 
is combined with area description)), however, the intention of the example is to demonstrate the staged process 
towards assessing a mystery, the prediction. IPBs are primarily used in operational and tactical military contexts, but 
the principle may just as well take effect when constructing strategic or speculative-evaluative intelligence. 
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3. Course of action (CoA) evaluation, in order to assess how the actors will act when own 
forces commence operations. 
 
The first stage is descriptive, focusing on basic intelligence and the uncovering of Kent's 
indisputable facts and Gates' knowable secrets. This makes up the prediction's context, its 
explanans (E, in the Inductive-Probabilistic outline above).  
 
Thereafter, IPB analyst develops the actor in question's commonplace modus operandi, his 
doctrinal course of action, the manner in which things have been observed to be done earlier (L, 
above). The likelihood that these observations again may take effect is given a degree of 
probability (p, above). The sources for this stage may both be of Kent's secretive and Gates' 
mystery kind, as the link between past and future behaviour and intentions may be incompletely 
developed, even with individuals. 
 
In the IPB's final step, the bridging nature of the probabilistic law assists the processing analysts 
crossing into the predictive assessment. The analytical outcomes of the two previous stages (C 
and L) are combined to form a prediction about how the actor will operate in the given 
environment (E, above).  
 
This is merely the processing side of things. However, the IPB is built and disseminated, 
incrementally to the consumer. Each stage is presented individually, which allows the consumer 
to change, adapt or advance plans at a similar pace. This ensures that all assessments, at each 
step, are anchored to the already known, the uncovered, the familiar (cf FR 3-1 2004:ch 7; 
Ulfving 2002:79).  
 
5.6 Disseminating Predictions 
So far, this chapter has explored prediction in science and its application in intelligence. This 
section will outline an understanding of predictive intelligence, point to how predictions are 
supported by their context, probability and time, and show some common features with narrative 
dissemination. This improves understanding of the character of intelligence dissemination, as it 
shows how it can create accessibility, understanding of the premises of a predictive conclusion, 
and thereby make it actionable. 
 
--  63  -- 
5.6.1 Predictive Intelligence  
Predictive intelligence can be understood as contextualised and justified intelligence analyses 
that forecast future development at an event horizon that allow decision-makers to act in order 
to influence own position, and that assign a certain degree of probability of the actual 
occurrence of the forecast developments. A rather bulky sentence, it at least brings together some 
of the features that need to be brought into dissemination in order to present predictions to 
decision-makers in a relevant, applicable manner: 
– The context, provided by general knowledge, news sources, previous intelligence reporting 
or by knowable secrets, uncovered in the foregoing intelligence cycle. 
– A probabilistically conditioned justification, usually (as in the IPB) incrementally based on 
previous behaviour of the actor, or on the actor's stated intent, when assessed credible14. The 
temporal scope of the prediction must be in accordance with its timely delivery, enabling the 
consumer to take appropriate measures to secure his own interests. 
– These premises arc into the predictive conclusion, how the actor will behave given the 
context, in a given future.  
This may not always be made explicitly, though. Nor does it have to be. Intelligence products 
and presentations do, however, tend to explicitly differentiate between what is fact (in Kent's 
terms) or (knowable) secrets (in Gates'), and what is the uncertain assessment, the prediction of a 
mystery (cf Ulfving 2002:97-98). 
 
5.6.2 Context 
The contextual factors form a starting point, one end of the 'bridge' (von Wright 1971:13) that a 
predictive statement makes from the present to the future. The discussion on narratives and 
discourse failure in chapter 4 similarly showed how a contextual 'bridgehead' can improve 
common understanding and alleviate conceptual discourse failure. In the same vain as narratives, 
this context consists of actors, their intentions and their ability to adapt to their surroundings, like 
von Wright (1971:6) hinted at. 
 
5.6.3 Probability and Time 
Intelligence predictions, like Inductive-Probabilistic ones, need probabilistic conditioning 
(Marrin 2009:143). The conditioning illustrates uncertainty. It highlights the possibility of 
inductive misassumptions in the premises – the data and the indicators – and thereby in the 
conclusion itself. Thereby, the probabilistic conditioning maintains the reliability of the product 
to the consumer. 
                                                 
14
 This assessment is further conditioned, adding to the total probabilistic uncertainty. 
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In practice, this is done by assigning a phrase or syntax regarding the likelihood of the statement 
to it (cf Lowenthal 2009:132)15: 
'Based on the stable current conditions, it is likely that policy X will continue for the next six 
months. Therefore, development Y is highly likely, while the likelihood of event Z is low'. 
An assessment like this, while abstract for the sake of the example, includes the context ('current 
conditions'), the inductive, incremental probabilistic assumption or 'law' (policy likely to 
continue), followed by two conditioned predictions. 
 
The example as well included an assessment of the temporal scope of the prediction (the 
predictions are reliable for six months, the same period as policy X is assessed to hold up). 
Chapter 3 showed that timely dissemination is a necessary condition for applicable intelligence. 
In prediction, there is an explicit conflict between spending time collecting and analysing data to 
increase reliability of the premises, and the need to present the prediction at a time when it holds 
actionable value to the consumer. Intelligence products need to reach the decision-maker well 
before the fact (FFOD 2007:146). Forecasts of predictive intelligence allow decision-makers 
enough time to take active measures, not only passive. This window could be five minutes or 50 
years, the essential feature is that predictive intelligence is sufficiently long-term to allow for it.  
 
5.6.4 Prediction and Narratives  
Von Wright's approach to scientific prediction illustrated how an intelligence prediction is made 
reliable to the consumer by maintaining the antecedents. The conclusion appears correct, given 
the available data and premises. By conditioning the premises by uncertainty and temporal 
scope, the prediction can maintain applicability. Together, these antecedents of the prediction 
provide the decision-maker with information beyond the predictive statement itself. They expand 
his basis for taking pre-emptive action. In this light, predictive intelligence, while challenged 
regarding truth and validity, can be disseminated in a manner that fulfils the purpose of 
intelligence.  
 
It is alluring to conclude that a narrative form is suited to convey predictions. 
– Like predictions, narratives build (in von Wright's words 'bridge') from a familiar context of 
actors and their environment. 
                                                 
15
 The discussions on the labels in dissemination are growing (cf Lowenthal 2009:131-33). This thesis focuses more 
on the methodology of presentation than on the terminology of it, and thus leaves this discussion out. 
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– A narrative can convey history, how the actors traditionally manage themselves, thereby 
elucidating their intentions.  
– The narrative can, based on this, outline a future case of events, where the character of the 
actors, their intentions and their context create a new, reliable development.  
It could, however, just as well be the other way round; that conveying a prediction nevertheless 
implies 'doing narrative' (cf Flyvbjerg 2001:136). 
 
Anyhow, for the sake of the character of dissemination, it is worth noticing how three different 
understandings of a setting for strategic communication16 share a number of features: 
– Intelligence dissemination relies on relevance, applicability and accessibility.  
– Narratives are based on familiar contexts and story lines, inferences for and understanding to 
the recipient. 
– Prediction is based on context, and arc through probability into an outline of future 
development. 
This shows the complexity of intelligence dissemination, particularly when presenting 
predictions. Furthermore, it underscores how dissemination differs from processing, as it takes 
the processed intelligence further, making it accessible and understandable to the consumer.  
 
The next section will discuss whether these features put intelligence dissemination in a position 
where the applicability and accessibility provided by its (narrative) form is more important than 
its actual content.  
 
5.7 Narrative Intelligence Dissemination, Applicability and Truth 
Returning to an offspring of the Kent and Gates approaches to provider-consumer proximity, this 
section will debate whether the applicability so compellingly and accessibly conveyed in 
narrative dissemination can make up a predictive statement's lack of truth.  
 
This chapter has shown how validity is challenged in intelligence prediction and in the 
assessments on mysteries. This challenges the conveyance of knowledge, as knowledge invokes 
truth (Kuhns 2003:81, Malnes 2008:97-98). However, chapter 3 tended to argue that applicable 
insight is of more value to the consumer than is relevant knowledge alone. Chapter 4 further 
indicated that the knowledge gained from an intelligence narrative allows the consumer to 
                                                 
16
 In this context, strategic communication can be understood as the sharing of a uniform message from one 
institutional actor (the intelligence provider) to another (the consumer). 
--  66  -- 
discern among the other compelling stories in the narrative battle (cf Smith 2007:40; Freedman 
2006:22;78). 
 
Furthermore, in the Gates model of proximity between intelligence provider and consumer, the 
applicability of the product can, at least to a certain degree, take precedent over its relevance and 
objectivity. Even for Sherman Kent, being believed was a major ambition of intelligence 
providers (Lowenthal 2009:146). Actionable intelligence has more value than non-actionable 
(Johnson 2009:47), and narrative dissemination aims to come across as accessible, and thereby 
secure the understanding at the consumer end. A conclusion could be that the validity, the degree 
of truth and correctness of the predictive statement, is less important than the inferences the 
consumer can draw from it (cf Flyvbjerg 2001:137; Herman 1996:47). This is implicitly 
supported by Freedman's definition of a narrative (see section 4.2). 
 
Emphasising applicability over objectivity is close to the Gates approach to provider-consumer 
proximity. This line of thought is as well obviously closing on politicization and conceptual 
discourse failure. It may, as the Kent approach to proximity would argue, eventually reduce the 
long-term reliability of the product and thereby of the intelligence provider. The contrast 
between the Kent and Gates approach illustrates that both positions fear losing political 
relevance, though for different reasons (either by ignorance to fact or by obscurity to reality17). 
 
However, while truthful knowledge may be relevant to the consumer, he is still likely to act on a 
storyline that is accessible and understandable to him. Knowledge and truth are thus not 
sufficient to put the consumer in the powerful position Herman indicates, where his relative 
advantage is exploitable (cf Phythian 2009:67). There are several lines of argument to approach 
this position by. 
1. The truthfulness of a predictive statement – or, for that matter, any statement on Gates' 
mysteries – cannot be measured. This makes, essentially, the corresponding aspect of truth in 
knowledge irrelevant for predictive intelligence. Instead, the decision-maker needs 
something to work with. He needs actionable insight (Johnson 2009:47).  
2. As intelligence exists to empower politics, it may by definition spur action from the decision-
maker. This action may aim to change the impact and form of the predicted events. Measures 
employed by the consumer will shape future developments to a degree where the original 
                                                 
17
 Which may seem like similar causes, but ignorance to fact implies lack of objectivity, while obscurity to reality 
implies a lacking sense of purpose. 
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prediction turns out incorrect versus actual fact. The validity of the original statement is thus 
not only impossible to ascertain, it is irrelevant to begin with18. 
3. This as well highlights the temporal imperative of an applicable prediction. Being correct or 
truthful is of no value when the prediction is made to late for the consumer's window of 
opportunity. In the early phases of a development, an uncertain prediction may have better 
chance at winning the narrative battle (and thus shape the discourse), as it presents itself as 
actionable. While not precise, a timely prediction allows early action, which may very well 
be a better outcome than no action19.  
 
These lines of argument are somewhat far-fetched. They do, however, underscore two points, 
which make up a paradox of truthfulness in the dissemination of predictive intelligence: 
– a statement does not have to be a true representation of future events to be applicable, and 
– when the statement cannot become true, its degree of truth is an irrelevant measuring stick 
for its quality. 
For the intelligence provider, the paradox underscores the importance of actually forwarding a 
product, even if it is less than perfect. Epistemologically, the paradox is created by the lack of 
validity, of confirmable correspondence, between the predictive statement and actual fact. 
Narratologically, it is enhanced by the dissemination stage's ability to present a compelling story 
line that is more easily perceived as actionable by the consumer. 
 
5.8 A Summary: That Which Does not Exist 
This chapter has explored prediction in intelligence products, and discussed how the character of 
prediction may inflict on its dissemination. The aim of predictive intelligence is to enable 
decision-makers to prepare for or influence a development before it actually takes place. 
                                                 
18
 Say, for instance, that ISAF's intelligence branch predicts increased Taleban activity in an Afghan region, based 
on observation of current preparation and on the Taleban's regular modus operandi. The insight comes in time, is 
actionable, and ISAF may increase its own activity in that region. This, in turn, prevents or dulls the impact of the 
Taleban offensive, both for ISAF and for local civilians. On the one hand, this erodes the relationship between the 
intelligence prediction and the actual fact. On the other, it does not erode the relationship between the contextual 
factors and the factual development: at the time the assessment was made, the Taleban was in fact recruiting in the 
area and planning concrete actions. Thus, the assessment might actually say that the Taleban was planning for action 
(intention) and gaining strength (capability), which together made up the threat that, if unchecked, could have 
implications for ISAF in the region. 
19
 For instance, the intelligence organisation may state that event E (an escalation of military training and readiness 
in a neighbouring state) will happen at time T (within 14 days). This information enables the decision-maker to 
instigate measure M (increase own readiness and surveillance along the border). However, by T, E does not take 
effect. Instead, an even more aggressive move E+1 (a realistic exercise involving hostile positioning for invasion in 
border areas) happens at T+1 (within the month). While wrong in two instances (extent and time), the original 
intelligence product allowed the decision-maker to do M, by which he was prepared for an exercise, and at T+1 was 
in a far better situation (having improved SA) to understand what was going on. Had the assessment not come forth 
in the first place, because of the risk that it was wrong, the decision-maker would be susceptible to misinterpreting 
E+1. 
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Prediction deals with the unknown, what Robert Gates called mysteries. It rests in what von 
Wright called the Aristotelian scientific tradition, emphasising the understanding of another 
actor and his intentions. 
 
Prediction is a scientific concept, a rational and justified statement on an unknown development. 
While the validity of such statements is constricted, their reliability may be constructed and 
illustrated through contextual and probabilistic premises. This justification is however not able to 
overcome the problem of induction; the possibility that human experience (on which 
assumptions of the future are based) will be proven wrong at the next crossroads. The discussion 
in this chapter seems to indicate that these premises support the reliability of a predictive 
statement when they are disseminated along with it. 
 
However, emphasising the narrative aspects of dissemination, a predictive product's truthfulness 
can be subordinated to its accessibility and applicability. A prediction's degree of truth is 
impossible to ascertain, and can thereby not be the standard to which a prediction is held. At the 
same time, a statement does not have to be a true representation of future events to be applicable 
to the consumer, actually improving his situational awareness. 
 
For intelligence purposes, this chapter has argued that the ability to predict in a probabilistic, but 
timely and reliable, manner is vital for an intelligence provider. Predictions about matters of 
concern and importance for the consumer may constitute important inputs for his further 
decision-making. This is why reliability in the processing of intelligence predictions can lead to 
credibility and understanding in dissemination. 
 
 
6 Towards Some Conclusions 
 
Dissemination tends to be intelligence's Achilles Heel. 
--  Michael Herman 1996 (:45) 
 
This is what will be. 
--  Bruce Springsteen, 'Magic', 2007 
 
6.1 Purpose and Outline 
The purpose of this thesis has been to elucidate an understanding of what and how the 
dissemination stage contributes to the purpose of intelligence, in order to contribute to a better 
understanding of how the stage is utilised to the benefit of intelligence agencies and their 
consumers. Four chapters have examined the purpose and process of intelligence, the 
dissemination stage of this process, the relationship between intelligence dissemination and 
narratology, and the particularities of disseminating intelligence predictions, respectively, in 
order to answer what characterises dissemination of intelligence. 
 
This concluding chapter will revisit the findings and make an effort at bringing them together as 
a whole. The chapter does so in four parts. Section 6.2 will answer the research question by 
providing a simple model for dissemination in the context of the intelligence cycle. Sections 6.3 
and 6.4 will then answer the specific questions that detailed the research question in chapter 1, 
and as well indicate what the thesis has come to regarding the informal inquiries on studying 
dissemination that introduced the thesis. Then, section 6.5 will note a few lessons on research 
design, before section 6.6 finally concludes on the thesis' research question. 
 
6.2 The Character of Intelligence Dissemination: Towards a Detailed Outline 
The character of intelligence dissemination was outlined in basic form in chapter 3, and the 
discussions in chapter 4 and 5 added further detail. The dissemination stage of the intelligence 
cycle translates the processed intelligence into a product servicing the consumer, fulfilling the 
purpose of intelligence by providing him with improved situational awareness. The 
dissemination stage does this by 
– Deductively selecting premises and conclusions from the processing stage for presentation to 
the consumer. This is done by vetting, internally in the intelligence organisation, and ensures 
that the disseminated product conveys and maintains the reliability and justification 
established in processing. 
– When conveying predictions about an unknown, future development, providing the consumer 
with a familiar context or starting point, thereby reducing the risk of conceptual discourse 
failure.  
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– Ensuring that a product actually is disseminated at a time when it is applicable for the 
consumer. Assessments of mysteries will never be absolutely truthful, but they may shape the 
consumer's perception of context and discourse at an early stage. Thus, intelligence may go 
forth in the narrative battle and find itself in an improved position to provide the consumer 
with even more precise estimates as the situation progresses. 
 
Some of the features discussed in this thesis are brought together in figure 6.1. Here, the 
dissemination-consumer relationship of the intelligence cycle shown in figure 2.2 is outlined in 
more detail, emphasising how the processed intelligence at the dissemination stage is translated 
into a service. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. A simplified outline of the dissemination stage of the intelligence cycle. 
 
– The 'standard model' of the intelligence cycle (figure 2.2) is shown bottom right. The dotted 
square shows the portion detailed in figure 6.1. 
– The output of the processing stage is translated (as was outlined above) from product to 
service, resulting in the consumer improving his situational awareness. 
– The disseminated intelligence product addresses the already stated (conscious) demands of 
the consumer (which he 'pulls' from the intelligence organisation), but as well stays relevant 
by 'pushing' further insight intended to aid his SA. Any unresolved issues with the consumer 
are sent back to the cycle (cf the discussion on the direction of the cycle in section 3.6). 
– The resulting policy changes the consumer's demands, and the cycle re-starts.  
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The outline suggested in the figure is based on the findings of the thesis, and gains on the simple 
outline in chapter 2 by illustrating 
– the deductive selection of premises – context and probability – from the processed 
intelligence product; 
– the interplay between provider and consumer in dissemination; and 
– the value added to the consumer's SA by way of the intelligence product and service. 
 
The figure illustrates the character of dissemination, in that it is this stage of the intelligence 
process the consumer interacts with. The dissemination stage is the face of intelligence. It 
delivers what the consumer needs and can act on. Therefore, the dissemination stage plays an 
important role in validating intelligence at large, by making sure that the preceding process has 
not been a waste of time and money. 
 
6.3 Understanding Intelligence Dissemination: Questions and Answers 
Section 1.3 posed a collection of particular questions, detailing the overall research question. The 
analytical chapters made an attempt to answer one question each. Summed up and brought 
together, this thesis arrived at these answers. 
 
6.3.1 What constitutes intelligence, and how is it put together and conveyed to the end user? 
Intelligence is a an institutionalised process that provides information tailored to a decision-
maker's area of need and interest, in order to improve his situational awareness, making him 
capable of achieving something he otherwise could not. While specialised, the structural and 
cyclic stages of an intelligence organisation are highly inter-dependent. This has provided a 
framework for analysing dissemination as a part of the process, as well as the interaction in it. 
 
6.3.2 What is achieved at the dissemination stage of the intelligence cycle? 
The dissemination stage of the intelligence cycle conveys processed, relevant, applicable and 
timely assessments from the intra-intelligence sphere to the consumer outside this sphere. This is 
as well the object of intelligence itself, as the dissemination stage translates the processed 
product into a service and improves the consumer's situational awareness. This understanding 
isolates the purpose of intelligence dissemination from the other phases of the intelligence cycle. 
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6.3.3 How does intelligence dissemination adhere to narratology? 
In intelligence dissemination, a narrative can be understood as a consistent story line 
emphasising the possible outcomes of a dynamic agency-structure interplay, from which the 
consumer may draw conclusions that aid in his decision-making. Narrative intelligence 
dissemination stands out in the decision-maker's stream of information, and puts intelligence 
ahead in the narrative battle. Studying dissemination from the perspective of narratology puts it 
in a realistic context of strategic communication. This makes the purpose of dissemination and 
advantages of intelligence stand out clearly. 
 
6.3.4 What needs to be disseminated to support a predictive conclusion? 
Predictions are about mysteries, the unknowable. Predictive intelligence seeks to enable the 
consumer to prepare for a development before it actually takes place. Predictions lack 
corresponding truth, and are therefore hard to convey in a reliable manner. They rely on 
justifying analyses based on contextual and probabilistic premises. These support the reliability 
of the prediction when they are disseminated along with it.  
 
6.4 On Studying Intelligence Dissemination 
Chapter 1 started out with three rather colloquial inquires on the virtue of studying intelligence 
dissemination at all. The thesis has not addressed these directly, but given that it started from the 
paradox of slim academic emphasis, the inquiries deserve a brief mention at this point. 
 
6.4.1 The Troublesome Dissemination Stage 
Chapter 1 inquired whether the dissemination stage may cause trouble for the intelligence 
process. The thesis has shown that it can. In spite of good processing, incomprehensible 
dissemination can ruin the value of intelligence. It is therefore, most likely, not the lack of 
challenge that causes literature to be brief on intelligence dissemination. Both Johnson (2009:46) 
and Herman may (1996:45) be correct in their lament on the challenges of the dissemination 
stage.  
 
6.4.2 Disconnecting Dissemination from the Cycle 
Chapter 1 inquired whether studying dissemination as an isolated phenomenon is at all possible. 
The thesis has shown that it at times is hard delineating the study of intelligence dissemination 
from, particularly, intelligence processing. The quality of the product eventually delivered to the 
consumer depends on the quality, thoroughness, objectivity and reliability of the analysis at the 
processing stage. The discussion on the reliability of predictive intelligence shows that studying 
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dissemination alone can not provide a fully satisfying answer. The literature, too, tends to draw 
lessons on dissemination from the discussions on analysis (see f.i. Lowenthal 2009:ch 6). 
Therefore, the integration of the intelligence process may be a reason for the apparent brevity of 
the literature on dissemination proper.  
 
6.4.3 Former Studies on Intelligence Dissemination 
Chapter 1 indicated that intelligence dissemination may not have been subject to extensive study. 
This may be so, as no entry in the literature list below has the word 'dissemination' in its title. 
That, of course, does not say much. There are, however, plenty of sources on the interaction 
between intelligence provider and consumer and on the purpose intelligence is to serve. This 
thesis has as well been swimming those waters. The existing literature, though, fail at times to 
make the connection that Johnson (2009:47-48) makes, and that has evolved through the 
analytical chapters of this thesis: that intelligence reporting may be ignored, lost or not deemed 
actionable, because of pre-determined policy or other sources capturing the narrative ahead of 
intelligence. 
 
6.5 Notes on the Research Design 
Section 6.2 answered the research question by outlining some details on how the dissemination 
stage serves its purpose. Above, the other questions from chapter 1 have as well been addressed. 
The thesis has thereby done what it set out to do, concluding on a modest contribution to 
modelling and theory. However, a brief evaluation of the thesis research design is due.  
 
6.5.1 Method 
The thesis has employed an intensive, exploratory, literature-based approach, in order to 
understand the character of intelligence dissemination as a phenomenon. This approach has 
proven fruitful in answering the both the specific questions and the research question. The 
character of intelligence dissemination has been brought out gradually: 
– Studying intelligence-making at large was necessary to conclude on dissemination's context; 
its position as both a separate stage and an integral part of a whole. 
– Studying what constitutes dissemination was necessary to approach its contents; what the 
stage aims to achieve. 
– Studying narration in intelligence was necessary to conclude on how the intelligence 
provider can gain the attention and understanding of the consumer, by shaping a common 
frame of reference and bring the story to the consumer at a point in time where he is 
receptive to it. 
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– Studying prediction was necessary to specify how demanding intelligence content is 
conveyed; as intelligence commonly features predictions, conveying them is part of 
dissemination's character. The outline of prediction as well highlighted how elements of 
narratives and prediction work together to make intelligence dissemination accessible and 
understandable. This clarity is as well a characteristic of intelligence dissemination. 
This approach has contributed to reliable conclusions in the thesis, given the applied sources. 
 
In retrospect, the thesis' major methodological disadvantage is its unconfirmed validity versus 
actual intelligence dissemination. To ensure this would have required a case study proper, or a 
survey of the processing and dissemination of a number of factual intelligence products. For the 
purpose of this thesis, that was not possible. It may, however, be subject to other studies, as may 
any of the other approaches mentioned in chapter 1. 
 
6.5.2 Use of Literature 
The available literature on intelligence is abundant enough to study both dissemination and its 
place in the intelligence process at large. The thesis aimed to balance some selected doctrinal 
guidelines and specific texts with mainstream textbook approaches, in order to gain a middle 
ground on what characterises intelligence dissemination. This proved useful. Initial parts of the 
thesis relied on textbook and doctrinal approaches, describing what Merrin (2009) would call a 
'standard model' of intelligence. As the thesis primarily was exploratory, this was the natural 
starting point. Later, the thesis moved to sources specifying particular challenges or weaknesses 
in dissemination and intelligence provision. This approach modified the original textbook 
positions, but as well made for new insight: delineation of concepts, the importance of premises 
and context to the conclusions, and the discourse-shaping impact of an intelligence narrative. 
This was done with a conscious attempt at maintaining the epistemological dimension of both 
prediction and narratives. 
 
The draw-back is of course that this approach is rather abstract and theoretical. This was not a 
case study, in the sense that there was no example or historical instance that could give shape to 
the presentation. This as well affects the validity of the conclusions: they are hypotheses, in that 
the thesis has not tested them against anything. They are drawn from literature, not from a 
sample of reality. 
 
In spite of this, the thesis managed, by way of its exploratory design and sub-sets of questions 
and inquiries, to come to an understanding of intelligence dissemination that was not present and 
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explicit in either single source before. Thereby, the thesis has fulfilled its modest ambition and 
purpose. 
 
6.6 'This is What Will Be': What Characterises Dissemination of Intelligence 
The dissemination stage of the intelligence cycle translates processed intelligence into a product 
servicing the consumer. It maintains the reliability of the conclusions, as it was formed at the 
processing stage. It works from a context of actors and their environment, familiar to the 
consumer. It delivers the service at an appropriate time. This way, intelligence dissemination 
makes the output of the processing stage accessible and thus applicable to the consumer. This is 
how the stage fulfils the purpose of intelligence by providing the consumer with improved 
situational awareness and an ability to create policy of a quality otherwise impossible. In 
combining these features to a narrative, intelligence can stand out with the decision-maker. 
Intelligence can shape the discourse, succeeding in the narrative battle. Through the 
dissemination stage, intelligence providers can maintain relevance and avoid miscommunication. 
 
This is what characterises dissemination of intelligence. 
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